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CAN’T WE JUST TALK ABOUT THIS FIRST?:
MAKING THE CASE FOR THE USE OF
DISCOVERY DEPOSITIONS IN ARKANSAS
CRIMINAL CASES
Bryan Altman*
INTRODUCTION
“[T]he quest for better justice is a ceaseless quest, that the
single constant for our profession is the need for continuous
examination and reexamination of our premises as to what law
should do to achieve better justice.”1 From time to time, it is
important that we take stock of our legal surroundings and ask
ourselves if our procedures are still properly serving us, or if there
is need for change and improvement. In this Article, I argue that
the time has come for Arkansas to provide the criminal defense
bar with the affirmative power to conduct discovery depositions.
Arkansas criminal defendants currently proceed largely in the
dark with light only being shed on the case as the prosecutor
chooses to provide material to the defense.2
A fair trial is a search for the truth,3 and discovery is how we
get to that truth.4 Expanding our tools of discovery expands our
*

The author thanks colleague attorney Shane Wilkinson, Wilkinson Law Firm, for his
mentorship and encouragement. Additional thanks to Tiffany Murphy, Associate Dean for
Academic Affairs and Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law and Matthew
Bender, Clinical Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law for always being available
to provide feedback and critiques and helping identify the scope of this discussion.
1. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for
Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 279 (1963).
2. See infra Section II.A.
3. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963) (“The function of a criminal trial
is to seek out and determine the truth or falsity of the charges brought against the
defendant.”); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965) (“Court proceedings are held for the
solemn purpose of endeavoring to ascertain the truth which is the sine qua non of a fair
trial.”).
4. Brennan, supra note 1, at 291 (“We must remember that society’s interest is equally
that the innocent shall not suffer and not alone that the guilty shall not escape. Discovery,
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ability to find the truth. Currently, Arkansas does not require that
the State disclose witness statements, expected testimony, or
police reports.5 Rather, the law currently holds that such
disclosures are made merely at the benevolence of the
prosecutor.6 The result is that criminal defendants are the only
litigants in Arkansas who are forced to proceed to trial in the dark
subject to surprise testimony.7 Allowing for depositions in
criminal cases will allow defense attorneys to affirmatively turn
on the light and go and find the truth for themselves rather than
wait for the prosecution to trickle out pieces of its investigation.
If the truth is the truth, then there should be no harm in expanding
the ways we can find the truth by allowing defense attorneys to
be a part of the discovery process.
Part I of this Article discusses the limited federal
constitutional requirements for criminal discovery. Part II
provides an overview of the current Arkansas criminal discovery
rules as related to the discovery of witness statements and police
reports. Part III takes a brief look at the historical origins of both
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Arkansas Rules
of Criminal Procedure and how those histories can inform our
modern review of the rules. Part IV examines discovery practices
of other states, including the thirteen states which currently allow
for discovery depositions in criminal cases. Part V addresses
policy arguments both in favor of and in opposition to criminal
discovery depositions. Finally, Part VI provides a list of goals
and objectives for what any proposed rule or legislation in
Arkansas regarding criminal discovery depositions should
address.

basically a tool for truth, is the most effective device yet fashioned for the reduction of the
aspect of the adversary element to a minimum.”).
5. See infra notes 14-16 and accompanying text; Section II.A.
6. See infra Section II.A.
7. See infra Section II.A.
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FLOOR FOR
DISCOVERY—OR LACK THEREOF
“There is no general constitutional right to discovery in
criminal cases . . . .”8 The United States Supreme Court has only
recognized two express rights to criminal discovery. The first
being that a defendant is entitled to receive all material
exculpatory and impeachment evidence.9 The second being that
when the State permits discovery against the defendant, the
defendant must be given reciprocal discovery rights against the
State.10 Otherwise, the “right” to pretrial discovery in criminal
cases has been left to the states to “experiment[]” with as they see
fit.11 Thus, with few federal guidelines, the question becomes,
what discovery rights does Arkansas currently provide?
II. THE RESTRICTED STATE OF CRIMINAL
DISCOVERY IN ARKANSAS
Arkansas’s written discovery rules have been categorized as
existing somewhere in between the most restrictive models of
“closed-file” discovery and the most liberal models of “open-file”
discovery.12 The most restrictive, textualist reading of the
8. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470,
474 (1973) (“[T]he Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery
which the parties must be afforded . . . .”).
9. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,
154 (1972) (holding material evidence relating to the credibility of a witness falls under the
scope of Brady).
10. See Wardius, 412 U.S. at 472, 474 n.6, 479 (holding an Oregon law requiring the
defendant to disclose his alibi witnesses without requiring the State to provide reciprocal
discovery of its rebuttal witnesses to be unconstitutional and noting the “Court has [] been
particularly suspicious of state trial rules which provide nonreciprocal benefits to the State
when the lack of reciprocity interferes with the defendant’s ability to secure a fair trial”);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 n.11 (1970) (suggesting that the constitutionality of a
state’s alibi-notice rule will depend on “an inquiry . . . into whether the defendant enjoys
reciprocal discovery against the State”).
11. See Wardius, 412 U.S. at 474. For a comprehensive, empirical analysis of the
differences among state discovery schemes as relates to plea bargaining, see generally Jenia
I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal Cases: An
Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285 (2016).
12. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 11, at 303-06, app. B at 400. Professors Turner
and Redlich categorized jurisdictions that do not require disclosure of witness names, witness
statements, or police reports as “closed-file” systems and jurisdictions that do require
disclosure of such materials as “open-file” systems. Id. at 303-06. Jurisdictions like
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Arkansas discovery rules and statutes provides a criminal
defendant with limited access to a select few pieces of the State’s
file.13 Defense counsel in Arkansas does not have any “right” to
receive either witness statements14 or police reports,15 nor does it
have the power to depose witnesses to discover such information
independently.16
A. Limited Mandatory Disclosures
Currently, the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure do not
require that a prosecutor disclose witness statements or expected
testimony before trial.17 However, by statute, a defendant has the
right to demand the State produce “any statement” of a witness
once the witness has testified on direct examination at trial.18 The
effect being that the defendant has no pre-trial discovery right to
witness statements, but merely a mid-trial discovery right
requiring cross-examinations to be concocted in the hallways of
the courthouse during a recess.19 However, if that handicapping
Arkansas that require disclosure of some but not all of these materials were categorized as
“intermediate” systems. Id. at app. B at 400. As noted by Turner and Redlich, Arkansas
Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.1 requires discovery of witness names but not witness
statements (other than those of co-defendants) or police reports. Id.
13. See infra Sections II.A.-B.
14. Thompson v. State, 322 Ark. 586, 588, 910 S.W.2d 694, 696 (1995) (holding the
State is under no obligation to provide non-expert, non-exculpatory witness statements
before trial).
15. While it would seem unfathomable that a defense attorney could adequately
investigate his client’s case without access to the relevant police reports and equally
suspicious that a prosecutor would refuse to disclose such reports, it must be acknowledged
that Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.1 very plainly does not mandate discovery of
police reports. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1; see, e.g., Goodwin v. State, 263 Ark. 856, 86768, 568 S.W.2d 3, 10 (1978) (holding the defendant was not entitled to receive nonexculpatory reports from a detective). Because the Arkansas courts routinely engage in a
narrow reading of Rule 17.1, I include police reports in this discussion as another
commonsense piece of discovery withheld from defense counsel with no legitimate policy
justification.
16. See infra Section II.B.
17. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1.
18. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-89-115(b) (2005) (so long as the statement relates to the
subject matter of the witness’s testimony).
19. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-89-115(c)(5) (“Whenever any statement is delivered to
a defendant pursuant to this section, the court, in its discretion and upon application of the
defendant, may recess proceedings in the trial for such time as it may determine to be
reasonably required for the examination of the statement by the defendant and his or her
preparation for its use in the trial.”).
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of defense counsel were not enough, then one could take comfort
from the fact that not every “statement” from a witness is subject
to disclosure under the statute. A witness “statement” is narrowly
defined as “[a] written statement made by the witness and signed
or otherwise adopted or approved by him” or a “substantially
verbatim recital of an oral statement made by the witness to an
agent of the state and recorded contemporaneously with the
making of the oral statement.”20 In determining whether a
statement is “substantially verbatim,” the courts look to “the
extent to which it conforms to the language of the witness, the
length of the written statement in comparison to the length of the
interview, whether quotations may be out of context, and the lapse
of time between the interview and the transcription[.]”21 The
result is that witness statements are not subject to disclosure if the
prosecutor or police officer interviewing the witness does not take
sufficiently detailed notes.22
For example, in Harper v. State, the defendant was charged
with raping and sexually assaulting his stepdaughter, K.S.23
According to the defendant, K.S. recanted her allegations on four
separate occasions to multiple individuals, including law
enforcement.24 The defendant then asked that the prosecutor
produce his notes from an interview with K.S. held shortly before
trial.25 The defendant wanted the notes “to determine ‘[w]hat was
said to make K.S. change her story, and what K.S. said prior to
changing her story.’”26 Ultimately, despite the fact that the notes
included remarks outlined in quotation marks, the Arkansas Court
of Appeals held that the notes were not subject to disclosure
because: (1) “[t]he prosecutor stated that she ‘did not write down
verbatim what [K.S.] said[]’”;27 (2) there was no guarantee that
20. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-89-115(e).
21. Harper v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 4, at 6, 592 S.W.3d 708, 712 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Winfrey v. State, 293 Ark. 342, 345, 738 S.W.2d 391, 392 (1987)).
22. See id. at 6-7, 592 S.W.3d at 712-13.
23. 2019 Ark. App. 163, at 1-2, 573 S.W.3d 596, 598.
24. Harper, 2020 Ark. App. 4, at 3, 592 S.W.3d at 711.
25. Id. at 3, 3 n.1, 592 S.W.3d at 711 (Harper’s first trial ended in a mistrial and the
interview in question occurred before the first trial).
26. Id. at 3, 592 S.W.3d at 711 (quoting Harper, 2019 Ark. App. 163, at 10, 573 S.W.3d
at 602).
27. Id. at 4, 592 S.W.3d at 711 (quoting Harper, 2019 Ark. App. 163, at 10, 573 S.W.3d
at 603).
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the portions in quotation marks were accurate or in context;28 and
(3) the prosecutor only took three pages of notes for a two-hour
interview.29 While the holding in Harper may fit the specific
facts of that particular case, the ultimate import of the case is that
the State’s burden is lessened by poor investigative work. If a
prosecutor or police officer takes very thorough notes of a witness
interview, then those notes should qualify as a statement under
the statute.30 However, as Harper illustrates, where a prosecutor
or police officer fails to take notes or takes only incomplete notes
of a witness interview, the defendant is left without a remedy.31
This scheme incentivizes the State to not memorialize witness
statements lest they be discoverable at trial.32
Alternatively, many Arkansas prosecutors elect to forego the
rigid text of the codified discovery provisions and engage in openfile discovery.33 The Arkansas Supreme Court has outlined a
simple black-letter rule for open-file discovery:
If a prosecutor’s office intends to fulfill its discovery
obligations by relying upon an open-file policy, it must make
every practicable effort to ensure that the information and
records contained in the file are complete and that the
documents employed at trial are identical to the material
available to the defense in the open file.34

28. Id. at 6-7, 592 S.W.3d at 713. Despite the fact that the court did not address the
inverse proposition that there is no guarantee that the quoted portions were inaccurate, this
reasoning leads to the conclusion that statements may be withheld on the basis of poor
investigative work by the State.
29. Harper, 2020 Ark. App. 4, at 7, 592 S.W.3d at 713.
30. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
31. See Harper, 2020 Ark. App. 4, at 5-7, 592 S.W.3d at 712-13.
32. See Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield
to New Realities, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 541, 586, 601 (2006) (noting that open-file policies can
also incentivize police and prosecutors “to not reduce their knowledge to writing[,]”
therefore excluding it from what must be disclosed).
33. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 352 Ark. 92, 107, 98 S.W.3d 433, 442 (2003); Rogers v.
State, 2014 Ark. App. 133, at 4, 6, 2014 WL 668207, at *2-3. Arkansas Rule of Criminal
Procedure 17.2 gives prosecutors the choice to comply with discovery through an “openfile” policy by notifying defense counsel that material held by the prosecutor may be
inspected. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.2(b). Open-file policies are often carried out by the
prosecutor simply delivering his entire file to defense counsel. See THE JUSTICE PROJECT,
EXPANDED DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES: A POLICY REVIEW 2 (2007). Note that the
Arkansas courts and practitioners use a different set of definitions for “open-file” and
“closed-file” than do Turner and Redlich. See supra note 12.
34. Smith, 352 Ark. at 107, 98 S.W.3d at 442.
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Furthermore, “[m]erely because the prosecutor declares that the
files in the case are open, it cannot be taken to mean that he has
fulfilled his discovery obligations.”35 For example, a prosecutor
may not cite an open file but also direct defense counsel to seek
discoverable materials from other government agencies or
personnel.36
Thus, while the black-letter rules of discovery provide for a
narrow list of discoverable materials, prosecutors may relieve
themselves of the burden of sifting through their files and picking
which materials are actually responsive to a discovery request by
simply allowing full disclosure of their case files to defense
counsel.37 Unfortunately for defense counsel in Arkansas, the
Arkansas courts have seemed to reject the spirit and plain
language of the rule that open-file discovery be “complete.”
While not yet explicitly stated, the Arkansas courts have provided
dicta or holdings that lend support to the proposition that even
under an “open-file policy,” the State is merely obligated to make
sure the open file contains the specifically enumerated materials
listed in Rule 17.1 rather than actually be “complete” with all
materials held by the State.38
For example, in Hathcock v. State, when presented with
defense complaints of “surprise” testimony in a case where the
State provided an open file, the State argued it “was not obligated
to outline the exact course of potential testimony of its
witnesses.”39 The Arkansas Supreme Court agreed and cited case
law stating Rule 17.1 only obligates disclosure of witness names
and not witness statements.40 Similarly, in Woods v. State, the
35. Bussard v. State, 295 Ark. 72, 79-80, 747 S.W.2d 71, 75 (1988); see also Earl v.
State, 272 Ark. 5, 13, 612 S.W.2d 98, 102 (1981) (discussing how the prosecution’s openfile policy “may be a time saver for both the State and the defense; however, [] it often results
in the court being unable to determine whether discovery has been complied with under the
Arkansas Rules of Criminal procedure [sic].”).
36. Dever v. State, 14 Ark. App. 107, 112, 685 S.W.2d 518, 520-21 (1985).
37. See Rogers, 2014 Ark. App. 133, at 5-6, 2014 WL 668207, at *3-4 (finding the
defendant did not show that he was prejudiced by the State’s failure to list a witness on the
witness list as required under Rule 17.1 where the witness’s name and statement were
provided to the defendant in the State’s open file).
38. See Hathcock v. State, 357 Ark. 563, 573-74, 182 S.W.3d 152, 159 (2004); Woods
v. State, 323 Ark. 605, 609-10, 609 n.3, 916 S.W.2d 728, 730-31 (1996).
39. 357 Ark. at 573, 182 S.W.3d at 159.
40. Id.
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State sought to introduce opinion testimony from a detective
regarding bullet holes.41 The State argued it had an open file but
conceded that the testimony was based on conversations between
the prosecutor and the detective and not contained in a police
report in the “open” file.42 Ultimately, the Arkansas Supreme
Court did not reach the merits of the objection, holding it was not
properly made at trial; however, the court did provide a footnote
citation stating the “[s]ubstance of testimony by witnesses is not
required under Rule 17.1.”43
Again, while neither Hathcock, Woods, nor another case has
yet to explicitly hold that an “open” file need not actually be
“complete” and include witness statements, there is clearly a
common thread demonstrating that the courts dismiss complaints
about the adequacy of “open” files by relying on the narrow
language of Rule 17.1. Because the Arkansas Appellate Courts
have not yet fully articulated what it means for a file to be “open”
in regard to witness statements, police reports, or surprise
testimony in general, defense counsel access to witness
statements and police reports may be a mere courtesy extended
by the benevolence of our local prosecutors.44
B. Statutorily Permitted Depositions in Criminal Cases
If defense counsel does not have a firm procedural or
statutory claim to discover witness statements or police reports,
the question then becomes to what extent may defense counsel
independently discover such material? As a threshold matter,
unfortunately, one of the Arkansas defense bar’s most invaluable
tools, the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),45
cannot aid in the discovery of police reports or witness statements

41. 323 Ark. at 609-10, 916 S.W.2d at 730-31.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 609 n.3, 610, 916 S.W.2d at 730-31.
44. See generally Prosser, supra note 32, at 606-07 (noting how open-file policies do
not solve problems related to discovery of information not “reduced to writing”).
45. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-19-101—112.
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included therein.46 Police reports relating to open and ongoing
criminal investigations are not discoverable under FOIA.47
Now, a defense attorney obviously has the freedom to
contact any potential witness or police officer to see if she is
willing to discuss the case. However, two problems still exist.
First, we have to acknowledge that defense attorneys do not
always represent popular clients, and in many cases, the most vital
witnesses are actually the victims of the defendant. Witnesses
may have legitimate reasons to be unwilling to talk with defense
counsel.48 Second, even if a witness does talk with defense
counsel, a preservation problem arises. If the witness changes her
testimony at trial from what she initially told defense counsel,
how does the attorney address the discrepancy without making
himself a witness in the case? While a diligent defense attorney’s
investigation of a case should routinely involve contacting
witnesses, there is still the sober reality that witnesses are not
always as free to discuss the case with defense attorneys as they
are with prosecutors,49 and an effective cross-examination is not
built on a line of impeachment where the attorney is forced to pit
his credibility against the witness’s in front of the jury.
Then, if a defense attorney cannot obtain witness statements
or police reports in a discovery request to the prosecutor, and he
cannot obtain them through a FOIA request, and the witnesses are
reluctant to talk with the defense attorney, can he possibly depose
them to obtain their statements? To be blunt, no.
“In Arkansas, ‘the right to take depositions rests upon
statutory authority and in no case can the right be exercised unless

46. In criminal investigations, witness statements in the government’s possession are
primarily going to have been made to law enforcement officers and therefore included in
police reports.
47. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(6) (2021) (exempting from public inspection
“[u]ndisclosed investigations by law enforcement agencies of suspected criminal activity”);
Martin v. Musteen, 303 Ark. 656, 660, 799 S.W.2d 540, 542 (1990) (“[I]f a law enforcement
investigation remains open and ongoing it is one meant to be protected as ‘undisclosed’ under
the act.”).
48. Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes,
79 BROOK. L. REV. 1091, 1095 (2014) (noting defense counsel is free to conduct informal
discovery requests of witnesses but “there is also no right to a response”).
49. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
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the authority therefor exists.’”50 Arkansas law currently only
provides for two types of perpetuation depositions, as opposed to
general discovery depositions.51
1. Depositions of Child Sex Offense Victims
First, prosecutors are allowed to petition the court for leave
to take a videotaped deposition of any alleged victim of a sexual
offense or attempted sexual offense under the age of seventeen.52
This limited manner of deposition requires both the physical
presence of the defendant and his attorney and cross-examination
of the witness.53 It is a limited tool to preserve and present the
testimony of a child sex crime victim without requiring the child
to testify live in a courtroom full of strangers.54 However, this is
a one-sided tool allowing the State to request the deposition in
lieu of live testimony at trial—it does not give the defendant or
his attorney any greater advantage in preparation as to what the
testimony of the witness may be until it is already being taken on
the record.
2. Depositions of Absent Material Witnesses
Second, both parties may move for permission to take a
deposition of a material witness who is anticipated to be unable
to testify at trial.55 Again, this type of deposition is of no use as
a discovery tool because it merely allows a defendant to preserve
already known testimony from a witness. A defendant would
seemingly only use this tool to depose one of his own witnesses.
Although, perhaps, there may be the rare circumstance where this
manner of deposition is invoked by the State for one of its
50. McDole v. State, 339 Ark. 391, 399, 6 S.W.3d 74, 79 (1999) (quoting Russell v.
State, 269 Ark. 44, 47, 598 S.W.2d 96, 97 (1980)).
51. Jean Montoya, A Theory of Compulsory Process Clause Discovery Rights, 70 IND.
L.J. 845, 856 n.82 (1995) (“Perpetuation depositions are allowed to preserve the testimony
of witnesses who may be unavailable for trial.”); William Ortman, Confrontation in the Age
of Plea Bargaining, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 451, 487 (2021) (“Discovery depositions, as their
name suggests, are tools for discovering new information from or about the deponent.”).
52. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203(b) (1983).
53. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203(b).
54. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203(c)-(d).
55. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-44-201(a), 202(a) (1979 & 2005).
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witnesses, allowing the defendant to discover the witness’s
testimony before trial. However, even though the testimony
would be discovered before trial, it would still be discovered
“live” to the defense attorney during the deposition, and therefore,
still fraught with all the burdens of fashioning a defense in the
middle of trial.
Accordingly, Arkansas currently only allows for
preservation depositions of child sex offense victims and absent
material witnesses—neither of which is generally of any
investigative use to the defense bar.
C. Discretionary Authority to Order Depositions Under
Ark. R. Crim. P. 17.4
Although there is no mandatory authority to compel a
witness deposition, the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure
provide a discretionary catch-all provision allowing the court to
order additional discovery of “other relevant material and
information upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of
the defense.”56 Thus far, the Arkansas appellate courts have
hinted that depositions fall under this authority but have
ultimately been reluctant to accept arguments that depositions are
ever actually appropriate under Rule 17.4.57 The decisions
discussing the discretionary grant of depositions are plagued by
vagueness and lack any guidance to trial courts or defense counsel
as to when—if ever—a deposition may be appropriate under Rule
17.4.
In Sanders v. State, the defense attorney requested
permission to depose two out-of-state witnesses who refused to
speak with him.58 He naturally claimed their refusal to speak with
him inhibited his ability to prepare for trial.59 However, the
Arkansas Supreme Court summarily rejected his argument,
noting that he was allowed to cross-examine the witnesses at trial
56. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.4(a).
57. See Sanders v. State, 276 Ark. 342, 344-45, 635 S.W.2d 222, 223 (1982); Hoggard
v. State, 277 Ark. 117, 120-21, 640 S.W.2d 102, 104-05 (1982); Caldwell v. State, 319 Ark.
243, 247-48, 891 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1995); Spencer v. State, 285 Ark. 339, 339-40, 686 S.W.2d
436, 437 (1985); Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 472-73, 915 S.W.2d 702, 714 (1996).
58. 276 Ark. at 344, 635 S.W.2d at 223.
59. Id.
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and that he did not argue that he was not provided with their
statements after they testified on direct examination, pursuant to
statute.60 The court simply stated, “neither the statutes nor the
rule [17.4] provides for the taking of a deposition under the
circumstances present in this case.”61
Noticeably missing from the court’s analysis is what
circumstances would warrant the taking of a deposition—
especially considering the facts present of non-cooperative outof-state witnesses.62 Unfortunately, this theme has continued
through the limited body of cases denying defense requests to
conduct discovery depositions. The Arkansas Supreme Court has
indirectly acknowledged this lack of clarity noting, “we said there
might be some case in which a deposition might be required, but
we have never been presented with such a case.”63
However, perhaps the most egregious example of the lack of
guidance from the Arkansas courts on this point comes from
Misskelley v. State.64 The defendant wanted to depose the officers
who interrogated him as part of a broader defense strategy to
suppress statements made during his interrogation.65 The trial
court “offered to make the officers available for questioning, but
would not require them to submit to depositions.”66 The Arkansas
Supreme Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion
with this proposal,67 and in a vacuum, or as a matter of
pragmatism, this conclusion is likely sound. If the goal is to
obtain information from a witness through compulsory discovery
processes, the additional procedural dressings of a stenographer
and an oath at an interview to elevate it to a deposition may have

60. Id. at 344-45, 635 S.W.2d at 223.
61. Id. at 345, 635 S.W.2d at 223.
62. See id. at 344-45, 635 S.W.2d at 223.
63. Caldwell v. State, 319 Ark. 243, 248, 891 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1995); see also Hoggard
v. State, 277 Ark. 117, 120-21, 640 S.W.2d 102, 104-05 (1982) (“We prefer to leave the
decision . . . to the trial judges to be exercised on a case-by-case basis . . . .”); Spencer v.
State, 285 Ark. 339, 339-40, 686 S.W.2d 436, 437 (1985) (citing Hoggard and failing to
articulate any standard for when a deposition may be warranted).
64. 323 Ark. 449, 472-73, 915 S.W.2d 702, 714 (1996).
65. The defendant in Misskelley raised a detailed and multi-faceted argument about the
voluntariness of his confession. Id. at 464-72, 915 S.W.2d at 710-14.
66. Id. at 472, 915 S.W.2d at 714.
67. Id. at 472-73, 915 S.W.2d at 714.
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little extra value.68 However, the grave problem with Misskelley
is not the conclusion but, once again, the analysis—or lack
thereof. The Arkansas Supreme Court stated:
We have never held that a defendant should be allowed to
depose interrogating officers. The public policy
considerations alone dictate that depositions of police
officers should not be taken as a matter of routine, but only
in rare cases, subject to the trial court’s discretion. A
defendant’s discovery needs are ordinarily met by the broad
access given to him by the Rules of Criminal Procedure.69

The court readily cited “public policy considerations” as
justification alone to make deposing police officers
presumptively unreasonable.70 Yet, the court failed to explain
what public policy considerations it is referring to. This
conclusion is completely devoid of any support. The court
presents what appears to read as a black-letter rule without any
supporting analysis or discussion.71 The opinion nakedly cites
“public policy considerations” and ends the conversation.
Fortunately, this passage may simply be one of those obscure
lines of dicta present in our case law without any real consequence
because this language does not appear to have been cited or
repeated in the twenty-five years since it was first published.
Thus, while Rule 17.4 theoretically supports a trial court
permitting defense discovery depositions, there is no clear
guidance as to what circumstances would warrant such an
exercise of discretion.
D. Prosecutor’s Subpoenas (read: Depositions)
Of course, criminal discovery in Arkansas is not a balanced
system, as the State currently enjoys the power to conduct
discovery depositions of prospective witnesses. Arkansas
prosecutors are afforded the privilege of issuing what are

68. But see ARK. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) (allowing the use of prior statements given at a
deposition as substantive evidence for the truth of the matter asserted rather than merely as
impeachment material).
69. Misskelley, 323 Ark. at 472-73, 915 S.W.2d at 714.
70. See id. at 472, 915 S.W.2d at 714.
71. See id. at 472-73, 915 S.W.2d at 714.
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colloquially referred to as “prosecutor’s subpoenas.”72 Since
Arkansas allows for charge by information73 or indictment,74 a
prosecutor’s subpoena is designed as an investigative procedural
equivalent to examining a witness before a grand jury.75
However, this power to examine witnesses is actually greater than
that inherent in examining a witness before a grand jury because
a prosecutor may subpoena and examine a witness not only in the
initial investigation of a case, but also in preparation for trial after
charges have been filed.76 Perhaps the most unbalanced aspect of
this investigative power is that prosecutors are free to subpoena
and question defense witnesses before trial.77 In fact, doing so
would actually be the most natural use of the prosecutor’s
subpoena—to examine the defense’s witnesses—because a
prosecutor ordinarily would have little need to use the formal
process to question the State’s witnesses.78 Indeed, the
prosecutor’s subpoena is a powerful tool allowing the State to
unilaterally discover the details of the defendant’s defense.79
Although not titled as “depositions,” the prosecutor’s subpoena
allows the prosecutor to compel a witness to attend at a certain
time and place and give testimony under oath.80 That checks all

72. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-43-212(a) (2005); Holt v. McCastlain, 357 Ark. 455, 467,
182 S.W.3d 112, 120 (2004).
73. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-302 (1947).
74. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-401 (1947).
75. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-43-212(a) (“Such oath when administered by the
prosecuting attorney or his or her deputy shall have the same effect as if administered by the
foreman of the grand jury.”); Holt, 357 Ark. at 467, 182 S.W.3d at 120 (noting the
prosecutor’s subpoena is a functional equivalent to questioning before a grand jury).
76. Todd v. State, 283 Ark. 492, 493, 678 S.W.2d 345, 346 (1984).
77. See Neal v. State, 320 Ark. 489, 495, 898 S.W.2d 440, 444 (1995) (no error to
allow the State to subpoena and examine defense witnesses one month before trial).
78. David W. Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CAL. L.
REV. 56, 87, 89-90 (1961) (discussing the psychological advantage enjoyed by the State with
regard to witness cooperation and how “[l]ikely the reason that one does not hear proposals
to allow the [S]tate to take discovery depositions of witnesses other than defendant is that
realistically there is no need of such depositions because the informal availability of
witnesses to the [S]tate’s interrogation is generally satisfactory”).
79. See Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1191-92 (1960) (“Fairly clearly, pretrial discovery
by the prosecution is far-reaching. And it cannot in any sense be said to be matched by what
is available to the defendant or by what he can keep from the prosecution . . . .”).
80. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-43-212(a) (2005).
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the boxes of a deposition,81 and is in essence, a de facto
deposition.
Simply put, in Arkansas, prosecutors can conduct discovery
depositions, but defense attorneys cannot.
Let’s reset the table here to collect our rules. First, the
United States Constitution only mandates the discovery of
exculpatory and impeachment material82 and that the State’s
discovery rules be reciprocal in favor of the defendant.83 Second,
Arkansas defendants are only entitled to discover witness names
and addresses but not witness statements or police reports,84 and
voluntary disclosure under open-file discovery may not
necessarily broaden these requirements.85 Third, Arkansas
defendants are only entitled to receive “substantially verbatim”
prior statements of witnesses in the middle of trial.86 Fourth,
Arkansas defendants are only entitled to take perpetuation
depositions under narrow circumstances.87 Fifth, Arkansas
defendants may seek discretionary permission to engage in
witness depositions, but the only guidance ever provided on the
propriety of such depositions states that as a matter of “public
policy,” police officers should rarely be deposed.88 Sixth,
Arkansas prosecutors are allowed to subpoena (effectively
depose) any witness, including the defendant’s witnesses, and
thereby discover the nature of the defense before trial.89 Bottom
line, an Arkansas defense attorney has no right to see a witness
statement before trial or compel a witness to speak with him,
whereas an Arkansas prosecutor can compel defense witnesses to
appear for questioning and discover the nature of their
prospective testimony. But wait, how does the prosecutor
subpoena comply with the first rule about reciprocity?
81. See ARK. R. CIV. P. 30 (a), (c) (setting out the procedures and requirements for a
deposition).
82. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,
153-54 (1972).
83. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
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In Wardius v. Oregon, the United States Supreme Court held
that an Oregon notice-of-alibi statute was unconstitutional in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it did not provide for reciprocal discovery
rights for the defendant.90 The Oregon statute required the
defendant to give the State notice of the nature of his alibi defense
and the names and addresses of witnesses who would testify in
support of the alibi without requiring the State to disclose rebuttal
witnesses.91 Because the defendant did not properly give the
State notice of his alibi pursuant to the statue, both he and another
witness were not permitted to testify as to the defendant’s
whereabouts, and the defendant was ultimately convicted.92
The Court recognized notice-of-alibi rules “are based on the
proposition that the ends of justice will best be served by a system
of liberal discovery which gives both parties the maximum
possible amount of information with which to prepare their cases
and thereby reduces the possibility of surprise at trial.”93 The
Court also acknowledged that “increasing the evidence available
to both parties, enhances the fairness of the adversary system.”94
Yet, this principle is currently absent from the Arkansas scheme
of criminal discovery. The Court then readily distinguished the
nature of the Oregon statute with the notice-of-alibi rule upheld
in Williams v. Florida, explaining that the Florida rule was
“carefully hedged with reciprocal duties requiring state disclosure
to the defendant.”95 Unlike the Florida rule, the Oregon statute
required the defendant to disclose the names and addresses of his
alibi witnesses, but did not require the State to disclose the names
and addresses of witnesses it planned to use in rebuttal.96
The Court’s holding in Wardius is founded on a simple idea
of reciprocity and “balance”:
Although the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding
the amount of discovery which the parties must be

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

412 U.S. 470, 472 (1973).
Id. at 471-72, 472 n.3.
Id. at 472-73.
Id. at 473.
Id. at 474.
Wardius, 412 U.S. at 474-75 (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81 (1970)).
Id. at 470, 472 n.3.
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afforded, it does speak to the balance of forces between the
accused and his accuser . . . . [I]n the absence of a strong
showing of state interests to the contrary, discovery must be
a two-way street. The State may not insist that trials be run
as a “search for truth” so far as defense witnesses are
concerned, while maintaining “poker game” secrecy for its
own witnesses. It is fundamentally unfair to require a
defendant to divulge the details of his own case while at the
same time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise
concerning refutation of the very pieces of evidence which
he disclosed to the State.97

The Supreme Court’s language is clear and simple. Where a state
imposes discovery obligations to the detriment of the defendant,
due process demands he receive a reciprocal benefit from
discovery against the State. The Court’s reasoning is founded in
both common sense and the practical reality of the logistical
disparity between the State and the individual:98 “Indeed, the
State’s inherent information-gathering advantages suggest that if
there is to be any imbalance in discovery rights, it should work in
the defendant’s favor.”99
Accordingly, Wardius says in plain language that it is
“fundamentally unfair” for a defendant to be required to disclose
the details of his defense without reciprocal discovery of the
State’s rebuttal.100 How then, may a prosecutor subpoena and
examine defense witnesses under oath, but a defense attorney may
not subpoena and examine state witnesses under oath? The short
answer is that the Arkansas courts have grievously erred on this
point and failed to properly apply the import of Wardius.
The Arkansas Supreme Court first examined a complaint
that the unilateral prosecutor’s subpoena power violated due
process under Wardius in Alford v. State.101 The defendant in
Alford argued it was unfair that the State was able to subpoena a
witness and obtain his statement before trial whereas the
defendant could only obtain a prior statement of the witness after

97. Id. at 474-76 (internal citation omitted).
98. See id. at 475 n.9.
99. Id.
100. Wardius, 412 U.S. at 476.
101. 291 Ark. 243, 250, 724 S.W.2d 151, 155 (1987).
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he testified on direct.102 Because the witness in question was
called in the defense’s case-in-chief, the defendant argued the
prosecutor’s subpoena enhanced the State’s cross-examination
capabilities.103 The Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the
defendant’s challenge stating that the State did not abuse its
subpoena power “in an effort to obtain witnesses against the
appellant or to secrete their testimony from him before trial.”104
The court summarily rejected the defendant’s citation to Wardius
by stating that the witness in question was a defense witness, and
therefore, not a witness “against the appellant.”105
The Arkansas Supreme Court next revisited this topic in
Parker v. State, decided just a few months after Alford.106 The
defendant in Parker raised the same argument that he was denied
reciprocal subpoena power over the State’s witnesses when the
State subpoenaed and examined his expert witness.107 The court
again summarily rejected the argument stating, “[a]s in Alford, the
only witness subpoenaed by the [S]tate was called by the defense
to testify, rather than by the prosecution, and there is no indication
of abuse by the prosecutor of the subpoena power or that any
testimony was hidden from Parker.”108 Again, the Arkansas
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal to Wardius because the only
witness subpoenaed was a defense witness.
A more unique claim was presented in Armstrong v. State,
where the defendant argued that because he was not given
reciprocal subpoena power, the charges against him should have
been dismissed.109 Aside from rejecting this claim based on a lack
of authority for the proposition that the appropriate remedy for
such a violation would be a dismissal of the charges, the Arkansas
Court of Appeals went on to rely on the familiar reasoning from
Alford and Parker.110 The Court of Appeals noted that “all but
one” of the subpoenaed witnesses were called by the defense
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 251, 724 S.W.2d at 155.
Id. at 250-51, 724 S.W.2d at 155.
292 Ark. 421, 430-31, 731 S.W.2d 756, 761 (1987).
Id. at 430-31, 731 S.W.2d at 761.
Id. at 432, 731 S.W.2d at 761.
45 Ark. App. 72, 81, 871 S.W.2d 420, 426 (1994).
Id. at 82, 871 S.W.2d at 426.
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rather than the State and the defendant did not claim any surprise
as to the testimony of the one witness called by the State.111
In all three instances when the Arkansas courts have
examined this issue regarding Wardius and the prosecutor’s
subpoena, the courts have failed to address both the actual
substance of Wardius and the claims of the respective
defendants.112 The overriding theme in each opinion’s brief
analysis is that Wardius has no application when it is the
defense’s witnesses that are subpoenaed.113 This emphasis on the
fact that defense witnesses were subpoenaed is absolutely
contradictory to the plain reading of Wardius. Wardius held it
was unfair for the State to require a defendant to disclose the
names of his alibi witnesses, so that the State may then interview
those witnesses and prepare a rebuttal, without requiring the State
to disclose the names of its rebuttal witnesses.114 The Wardius
Court held it was unfair to require the defendant to give up his
case but remain subjected to surprise refutation by the State.115
This is the entire point that has yet to be squarely addressed by
the Arkansas courts. It is unfair for the State to have a deposition
power over the defense’s witnesses, to question them and learn
the nature and details of the defense, while requiring the
defendant to remain blind as to the State’s case-in-chief.116
By deposing defense witnesses, a prosecutor gains not only
knowledge of the defensive strategy, but also invaluable crossexamination material. If a defense witness’s testimony deviates
however slightly from what he previously stated under oath to the
prosecutor, the prosecutor has free ammunition to shoot down the
111. Id.
112. See supra notes 101-11 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 101-11 and accompanying text.
114. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1973).
115. Id.
116. The Utah Supreme Court has indicated its agreement on this point. In Gutierrez
v. Medley, the Utah Supreme Court held that under Utah’s parallel “Subpoena Powers Act,”
a prosecutor could only issue subpoenas prior to charges formally being filed but not after,
as is allowed in Arkansas. 972 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1988). Citing to Wardius, the court
noted that if the prosecutor could issue such subpoenas, the act would be constitutionally
suspect: “Furthermore, we note that had the legislature clearly stated that the Act applied
after the filing of charges without adding other substantive provisions permitting a defendant
to present evidence, confront the witness, and engage in reciprocal discovery, the Act might
have then been of questionable constitutional validity.” Id. at 917 n.3.
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defense. More importantly, the prosecutor will likely have this
information well in advance of trial, giving him plenty of time to
outline and strategize his attack. Conversely, the best a defense
attorney can hope for is that someone wrote down a “substantially
verbatim” record of a previous statement by the witness and that
he can cobble together an effective line of questioning in the halls
of the courthouse before the trial resumes.117
While not explicitly outlined in Alford, Parker, or
Armstrong, each opinion’s reference to surprise and the
subpoenaing of defense witnesses seems to suggest a
misapplication of Wardius. The Arkansas courts seem to have
rejected the Wardius challenges to prosecutor’s subpoenas based
on an improper framing of the nature of the challenges. The
courts seem to frame the challenge not as a complaint that the
State is able to subpoena defense witnesses, but rather, as a
complaint that the defendant is unable to also subpoena his own
witnesses. There is an implied reasoning in the cases that the
defendant does not also need the ability to subpoena his own
witnesses because he can avoid surprise by talking to his
witnesses and asking them about what happened during their
depositions with the prosecutor or by receiving a copy of their
recorded statements. However, this misses the point. The real
Wardius challenge is not that it is unfair for a prosecutor to
subpoena a defense alibi witness without allowing the defendant
to depose that same witness. The true application of Wardius is
to say that it is unfair for the prosecutor to subpoena a defense
alibi witness without allowing the defendant to equally depose the
State’s witnesses.118 Wardius, at its simplest reading, holds that
when the defendant has to turn over his witnesses’ names, the
State has to turn over its witnesses’ names too.119 Currently, the
Arkansas courts have not yet squarely addressed how, under
Wardius, the defense has to turn over its witnesses’ testimony, but
the State is allowed to conceal its witnesses’ testimony.
Accordingly, it is my position that Arkansas’s current law,
which essentially allows prosecutors to conduct discovery
117. See supra notes 18-32 and accompanying text.
118. See Wardius, 412 U.S. at 471-72.
119. Id. at 475-76.
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depositions of defense witnesses without allowing defense
attorneys to conduct discovery depositions of State witnesses, is
unjust, unfair, and unconstitutional under Wardius.
E. McDole v. State and a Failed Constitutional Challenge to
Arkansas Criminal Discovery
The leading case in Arkansas discussing the disparity
between civil litigants and criminal litigants and the use of
discovery depositions is McDole v. State.120 In McDole, the
Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the argument that it violates a
criminal defendant’s rights to provide compulsory depositions in
civil cases but not in criminal cases.121 The court rejected the
defendant’s attack on multiple fronts. The court began its
analysis by noting that Arkansas law only allows for depositions
to preserve material testimony “but does not allow a criminal
defendant to simply set up depositions at will and compel
attendance as in a civil case.”122 The court emphasized the
historical underpinning of this scheme, stating, “[a]pparently, this
has always been the law in Arkansas.”123 The court then turned
to the Compulsory Process Clause of the Arkansas Constitution124
and provided a line of citations for three seemingly inapposite
propositions: (1) that the Compulsory Process Clause does not
require that every witness testify at trial; (2) that specific
witnesses do not have to testify if the same facts can be
established through other witnesses; and (3) that witnesses
without relevant testimony are not required to testify.125 The
court then turned to “the federal side” and cited Wardius for the
familiar proposition that there is no general constitutional right to
pretrial discovery.126 Lastly, and most relevantly, the court
examined the claim that it violated the Equal Protection Clause to

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

339 Ark. 391, 398, 6 S.W.3d 74, 79 (1999).
Id. at 400-01, 6 S.W.3d at 80-81.
Id. at 398-99, 6 S.W.3d at 79.
Id. at 399, 6 S.W.3d at 79.
ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 10.
McDole, 339 Ark. at 400, 6 S.W.3d at 80.
Id.
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allow depositions in civil cases but not in criminal cases.127 In
rejecting this claim, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated:
Equal protection does not require that persons be dealt with
identically; it only requires that classification rest on real and
not feigned differences, that the distinctions have some
relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made,
and that their treatment be not so disparate as to be
arbitrary. The issue of equal protection involves “whether
people in the same situation are being treated differently
. . . .” While both criminal and civil defendants may be
called litigants, they are far from similarly situated.128

What is missing from the court’s holding is the reasoning as
to exactly why and how civil and criminal litigants are differently
situated to justify the disparate treatment.129 To forego lofty
metaphors or analogies about the principles of justice, it is easier
to just imagine a simple hypothetical case. A man is accused of
getting into a drunken brawl at a bar. He is simultaneously
charged by the State with criminal battery and served a civil
complaint by the alleged victim for tortious battery. The
defendant is the same in both cases. Although the “plaintiff” is a
separate entity in both matters, the complaining and chief witness
is the same. The relevant facts and witnesses will be the same.
Indeed, the testimony produced at each trial should be identical.
What then, is the justification for allowing the defendant to
depose the alleged victim and any bystander witnesses in the civil
suit but not in the criminal case? This is the question McDole
fails to satisfy. McDole reaches a conclusion but fails to explain
exactly what legal alchemy takes place that presents a real and
substantial policy justification to allow the same person to depose
the same witnesses over the same matter to retrieve the same
testimony, possibly even in the same court130 and in front of the
127. Id. at 401, 6 S.W.3d at 80.
128. Id. at 401, 6 S.W.3d at 80-81 (internal citations omitted).
129. See id.
130. Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order 14 directs the circuit courts to
establish separate divisions for criminal, civil, juvenile, probate, and domestic relations
cases. Order 14. Administration of Circuit Courts, (2012). However, “[t]he designation of
divisions is for the purpose of judicial administration and caseload management and is not
for the purpose of subject-matter jurisdiction. The creation of divisions shall in no way limit
the powers and duties of the judges to hear all matters within the jurisdiction of the circuit
court.” Id. Accordingly, civil and criminal cases may be heard in the same circuit court.
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same judge,131 for his civil suit but not his criminal suit. How
does the man in our hypothetical example become “far from
similarly situated” from himself?132
We might stereotypically imagine civil litigation as “whitecollar” contract disputes between businesses and criminal
litigation as “blue-collar” disputes about acts of violence.
However, as a general proposition, victim-oriented behavior is
equally tortious and criminal. Battery and assault are both torts
and crimes.133 Trespass is a tort and a crime.134 Theft is a tort
and a crime.135 In fact, Arkansas law currently provides for a
catch-all cause of action for any felonious behavior.136 Under the
catch-all statute, not only is the relevant evidence the same, the
elements of the cause of action would also be the same, as the
civil plaintiff has to prove the elements of the underlying
felony.137 So what justification is there that if a homeowner
alleges residential burglary and seeks to take the defendant’s
money, the defendant is allowed to depose the homeowner and
any other potential witnesses, but if the local prosecutor alleges
residential burglary and seeks to take the defendant’s liberty, the
defendant must not be permitted to compel witnesses to speak
with him?

131. Administrative Order 14 states, “[c]ases in a subject-matter division may be
exclusively assigned to particular judges, but such assignment shall not preclude judges from
hearing cases of any other subject-matter division.” Id. Indeed, in rural circuits with only
one judge, every type of case would have to go in front of the same judge.
132. There is an inherent paradox when comparing the scope of civil and criminal
discovery and the respective stakes of each proceeding. See Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady,
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (2015) (“If the civil plaintiff, who seeks primarily the payment of
money, must share his evidence in advance of a trial, then surely the prosecutor, who seeks
the defendant’s loss of liberty or life, ought to suffer the same obligations.”).
133. Ark. Model Jury Instr., Civil AMI 418 (tort of battery); Ark. Model Jury Instr.,
Civil AMI 417 (tort of assault); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-13-201—207 (crimes of battery and
assault).
134. Barrows/Thompson, LLC v. HB Ven II, LP, 2020 Ark. App. 208, at 20, 599
S.W.3d 637, 649 (listing elements of tort of trespass); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-39-203 (2021)
(crime of trespass).
135. Ark. Model Jury Instr., Civil AMI 425 (tort of conversion); ARK. CODE ANN. §
5-36-103 (2021) (crime of theft).
136. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-107(a)(1) (2011) (“Any person injured or damaged
by reason of conduct of another person that would constitute a felony under Arkansas law
may file a civil action to recover damages based on the conduct.”).
137. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-107(a)(1)-(2).
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Underlying the conclusion in McDole is the recognition that
“this has always been the law in Arkansas.”138 McDole reaches a
conclusion that civil and criminal litigants are different because
we say they are, but it does not answer the question—why do we
say they are different? The reality is that the historical support
for denying criminal discovery depositions in Arkansas rests on
shaky ground and reluctance to change rather than concrete
policy.
III. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
In our modern legal landscape, we accept as a matter of
course, the distinction between civil procedure and criminal
procedure. This unquestionable tenet surely led to the conclusion
in McDole that civil litigants and criminal litigants are “far from
similarly situated.”139 However, while it may be the natural
position today that criminal discovery and civil discovery are
different, there is no satisfactory answer as to “why” they must be
so different. As this section explores, criminal discovery is only
in the limited position it is in today because of a historical desire
to favor efficient prosecution of the guilty rather than protection
of the innocent, a lack of organized input from the defense bar
during the drafting of the modern rules, and a lasting reluctance
to update our shared standards of justice.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have been largely
influential on the states,140 and prior to the adoption of the
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Arkansas courts often
turned to the federal rules for guidance.141 For that reason, I begin
with a discussion of the history of the Federal Rules of Criminal
138. McDole v. State, 339 Ark. 391, 399, 6 S.W.3d 74, 79 (1999).
139. Id. at 401, 6 S.W.3d at 81.
140. Meyn, supra note 48, at 1103-04; Turner & Redlich, supra note 11, at 303
(categorizing jurisdictions that restrict criminal discovery as following the federal discovery
scheme).
141. See, e.g., Lane v. State, 217 Ark. 428, 429, 230 S.W.2d 480, 480 (1950) (citing
Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(a)(2) “as illustrative of the reason of our conclusion” in a case involving
bail on appeal); Cabbiness v. State, 241 Ark. 898, 900-02, 410 S.W.2d 867, 869-70 (1967)
(citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) in holding it was reversible error for a trial court to hear a
suppression motion in the presence of the jury).
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Procedure and then turn to a corollary discussion of the history of
the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.
A. Reformation of Common Law Criminal Procedure in
Federal Courts
For centuries, under the common law, civil and criminal
procedure operated in parallel to each other, judged by the same
standards.142 However, as Professor Ion Meyn reports in his
detailed account of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the modern schism between civil and criminal
procedure was a concerted effort driven in part by ineloquent
prejudices and a lack of representation from defense counsel.143
In the early part of the twentieth century, civil procedure
underwent a fundamental transformation from the two-stage
process of formulaic, technical pleading and a subsequent trial by
surprise to an entirely new phase of litigation called discovery in
search of factual transparency.144 The United States Supreme
Court heaped praise upon the “innovations” of the expanded
discovery procedures stating:
Thus civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be
carried on in the dark. The way is now clear, consistent with
recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.
...
Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both
parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either
party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has
in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure
simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be

142. Ion Meyn, Why Civil and Criminal Procedure Are So Different: A Forgotten
History, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 701 (2017).
143. Id. at 727-34. Professor Meyn identifies the forces that he contends influenced
the ultimate rejection of the civil reforms for federal criminal procedure as: (1) the strong
pro-prosecutor agenda represented by certain members of the committee and a lack of any
balancing concerted representation from the defense bar and (2) a historical resistance to
change and progressivism in favor of the accused. Id. at 727-32.
144. Id. at 705-06.
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compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it,
thus reducing the possibility of surprise.145

The reforms were widely accepted and praised, and initially,
scholars noted their expectations that the same procedural rules
could apply in criminal cases.146
In fact, when the United States Supreme Court and Congress
turned their attention to promulgating a counterpart set of rules
for criminal procedure, the first draft of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure adopted the civil discovery rules almost
entirely.147 For instance, the first draft included “depositions,
document requests, physical and mental examinations, and
requests for admission.”148 Unfortunately, such proposals were
met with skepticism, seemingly born not out of reason, but rather,
out of the antiquated notion that because we have never done this
before, we should not do it now.149 Professor Meyn’s accounting
provides a familiar but disappointing line of argument among the
committee members: one member argued that depositions make
sense in a civil case because you want to find out what the other
side is going to say at trial, and another member replied, “that is
the trouble. I think you have the idea of civil practice injected
into the criminal procedure. To . . . go into the other side’s case
to examine anybody . . . before trial . . . is a thing you would never
think of in a criminal case.”150 This reasoning persists today and
is just as unsatisfying. The objection to depositions was merely
“that is not the way we do it.” If that same logic carried the day
when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were being considered,
then nothing would have ever changed. While we once did not
have depositions in civil cases, we eventually saw the wisdom in
the better practice of revealing all relevant information during
discovery.151
145. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501, 507 (1947).
146. Meyn, supra note 142, at 709.
147. Id. at 706, 720.
148. Id. at 720.
149. See id. at 712-13.
150. Id. at 721.
151. Professor Meyn notes, “Over 50 years ago, the United States Supreme Court
stated, ‘[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to
proper litigation.’ [Yet, c]riminal law has been spared of this wisdom.” Meyn, supra note
48, at 1140 (emphasis added) (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947)).
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As Professor Meyn accounts, the ultimate decision to leave
criminal procedure steeped in vestiges of the common law rather
than adopt the wisdom of the civil procedure reform is due largely
to one pro-prosecutor committee member’s “force of personality”
shoving the conversation in one direction152 and the lack of
representation from the defense bar during the discussions to
effectively push back.153 The committee members with criminal
litigation experience were almost exclusively prosecutors.154
With a strong prosecutorial-centered agenda represented at the
meetings without an equally concerted agenda on behalf of the
defense, the resulting rules skewed heavily in favor of the
prosecution.155 The resulting “reform” was merely to adopt the
civil reforms that eased the prosecution’s burden, such as relaxed
pleading standards, and reject the civil reforms meant to protect
the defendant and improve transparency and accuracy, such as
formalized discovery procedures.156
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court rejected the
committee’s first request to distribute a draft to the public because
the committee failed to provide a clear rationale for the rules.157
The truth was, many members of the committee operated under
the belief that “criminal law was just different.”158 It was not until
later that the leading personality of the committee elaborated that
152. Meyn, supra note 142, at 736. Professor Meyn’s article is full of many examples
of untenable positions of the Committee’s Secretary, Alexander Holtzoff, an Assistant
Attorney General. Id. at 707-08. Meyn’s article repeatedly provides accounts of Holtzoff
doing his best to preserve prosecutorial discretion and power and voicing stern opposition to
any proposed rules that would slow the criminal justice system. Id. at 714-17, 719, 727, 73435. For example, one of the more egregious positions held by Holtzoff was his approval of
three-day dockets in rural courts where, essentially, indictments are on Mondays, pleas are
on Tuesdays, and trials are on Wednesdays. Id. at 716-17. Holtzoff incredulously argued
that it was to a defendant’s benefit to be indicted on a Monday and convicted on a Tuesday.
Id. at 717. Meyn notes, “even today, reading from a flat transcript, Holtzoff flies off the page
as relentless.” Id. at 727.
153. Id. at 728-29 (only two members of the committee noted any experience in
criminal defense).
154. Id. at 728.
155. Id. at 724.
156. Meyn, supra note 142, at 725-26, 734 (“Led by Holtzoff, the reform of criminal
procedure integrated civil rules that increased efficiency, like notice pleading and liberalized
joinder, but rejected countermeasures designed to ensure accuracy, like judicial intervention
and discovery tools.”).
157. Id. at 732-33.
158. Id. at 733.
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the rules were driven by his “tough on crime” philosophy159 rather
than a search for efficiency and truth, as was the rationale for civil
procedure reform.
Accordingly, when first up for consideration, the starting
point for the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was to largely
mirror the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, especially with
regard to a robust, formal phase of discovery.160 However,
resistance to change and ineloquent fears of “delay” carried the
moment and largely preserved the status quo for criminal
litigants, except where benefits for the prosecution could be
gained.161 It cannot be emphasized enough that the affirmative
decision to leave criminal trials in the dark was not born out of
reasoned policy, but rather, tough on crime sentiments and
intuitions that criminal trials are “just different.”
B. Origins of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure
There are also lessons to be learned from the history of the
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. Mainly, we should
remind ourselves what standards guided our initial drafting of the
rules and what interests were most represented during the process.
In 1971, three workshops were engaged to study the
American Bar Association’s “Minimum Standards for the
Administration of Criminal Justice” and criminal procedure in
Arkansas.162 The procedural committee of the Arkansas Criminal
Code Revision Commission set out to draft a codified set of rules

159. Id. at 733-34 (quoting Alexander Holtzoff, Reform of Federal Criminal
Procedure, 12 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 119, 121 (1944)) (Holtzoff believed formulating the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[i]n a larger sense . . . must necessarily crystallize a
philosophy of administration of criminal justice . . . . [I]t must be conducive to a simple,
effective, and expeditious prosecution of crimes. Perpetrators of crimes must be detected,
apprehended and punished. The conviction of the guilty must not be unduly delayed.
Criminals should not go unwhipped of justice because of technicalities having no connection
with the merits of the accusation. The protection of the law-abiding citizen from the ravages
of the criminal is one of the principal functions of government. Any form of criminal
procedure that unnecessarily hampers and unduly hinders the successful fulfillment of this
duty must be discarded or radically changed.”).
160. Id. at 698, 705, 720.
161. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
162. In re Ark. Crim. Code Revision Comm’n, 259 Ark. 863, 863, 530 S.W.2d 672,
672 (1975).
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of criminal procedure for the state.163 The procedural committee
was guided by four goals:
“(1) substitution of simple
comprehensible language for archaic, verbose phraseology; (2)
elimination of procedural practices which are redundant, needless
or inconsistent; (3) realignment of procedural rules with
constitutional requirements; and (4) development of a fairer, more
efficient criminal justice process.”164 While worded differently,
these original cornerstones are also reflected in the text of the
rules.165
In 1971, as this work was first being undertaken, we turned
to the American Bar Association’s Standards as our guiding
light.166 In 1970, the ABA Standards did not recommend
discovery depositions concluding that, on balance, the costs of
depositions outweighed what were thought to be marginal
benefits.167 However, the ABA’s position has evolved, and today,
the ABA’s “Standards for Criminal Justice: Discovery” currently
calls for allowing both parties to conduct discovery depositions
upon leave of court “to prevent unjust surprise at trial.”168 The
ABA currently recommends that depositions be allowed upon a
showing that the current information or materials disclosed do not
adequately apprise the party of the witness’s knowledge to
prevent surprise at trial and the witness has refused to cooperate
in giving a voluntary statement to the moving party.169 Although,
as argued in Part VI infra, discovery standards should go even
further,170 the ABA Standards at least recognize some use of
discovery depositions in criminal cases. Nothing has changed in
Arkansas’s personal experience as a state since 1971 that says we
163. Id. at 863, 530 S.W.2d at 673.
164. Petition for Promulgation of Rules of Criminal Procedure at 1, In re Ark. Crim.
Code Revision Comm’n, 259 Ark. 863, 530 S.W.2d 672 (No. 74-345).
165. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 1.3 (“These rules are intended to provide for a just, speedy
determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in
procedure, fairness in administration, the elimination of unnecessary delay and expense, and
to protect the fundamental rights of the individual while preserving the public interest.”).
166. In re Ark. Crim. Code Revision Comm’n, 259 Ark. at 863, 530 S.W.2d at 672.
167. John F. Yetter, Discovery Depositions in Florida Criminal Proceedings: Should
They Survive?, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 675, 678-79 (1988).
168. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST.: DISCOVERY, STANDARD 11-5.2 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2020).
169. Id. at 11-5.2(a)(ii)-(iii).
170. See infra Part VI.
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should no longer pay any heed to the suggestions of the ABA.
The ABA’s Standards served us in 1971, and they can still serve
us today.
Moreover, similar to the circumstances of the drafting of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, it appears that prosecutorial
interests were more zealously represented than the interests of the
defense bar in crafting the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure,
at least as public comment was involved. While the Arkansas
Prosecuting Attorneys’ Association (“APAA”) filed various
petitions and briefs offering suggestions to the rules, there were
no corresponding petitions from any organizations representing
the Arkansas defense bar.171 Most notable is the now flipped
position once held by Arkansas prosecutors. In 1975, the United
States Supreme Court decided United States v. Nobles, which
gave a somewhat unremarkable holding that a federal trial court
did not abuse its discretion by requiring the defense to provide the
prosecution with limited portions of a private investigator’s report
for specific impeachment material regarding the investigator’s
conversations with key prosecution witnesses.172 However, the
APAA took that case-specific holding and argued it led to a
broader proposition: “It is clear as a matter of federal
constitutional law, defendants can constitutionally be compelled
to disclose their defenses, their witnesses and expected
testimony.”173 In 1975, the Arkansas prosecution bar was arguing
that the defense should have to disclose the expected testimony of
their witnesses. However, any cursory review of contemporary
discovery litigation will reveal the prosecution’s current
vehement objections to revealing the expected testimony of its
witnesses.174 Of course, the APAA’s lobbying for defense
witness statements was unnecessary because prosecutors have

171. See Case Docket, In re Ark. Crim. Code Revision Comm’n, 259 Ark. 863, 530
S.W.2d 672 (No. 74-345).
172. Supplemental Brief at 1, In re Ark. Crim. Code Revision Comm’n, 259 Ark. 863,
530 S.W.2d 672 (No. 74-345).
173. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
174. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 322 Ark. 586, 588, 910 S.W.2d 694, 696 (1995)
(agreeing with the State that the State is under no obligation to provide non-expert witness
statements before trial).
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long enjoyed the ability to essentially depose defense
witnesses.175
Looking at the formulation of our discovery rules in
Arkansas tells us a couple of things. It reminds us of the goals of
fairness and protection of the individual we ought to seek in our
ongoing refinement of the rules. It reminds us that we once
looked to the ABA Standards for guidance, and we would be well
served to keep those same standards in mind today. It reminds us
that there was not an equal organized effort to shape the rules by
the defense bar as there was by the prosecution, so we should be
mindful of what agendas may have tilted the scales at inception.
Lastly, it reminds us that there has long been a shared interest by
both sides of criminal litigation for valid reasons to discover the
anticipated testimony of witnesses. Neither the prosecution nor
the defense stands to benefit from surprise at trial, but currently,
our rules only seek to protect the prosecution.
IV. PRACTICES AND LESSONS IN OTHER STATES
Because criminal discovery is largely left to the states,176 it
is helpful to see what other jurisdictions are doing in their
experiments and what practices might be adopted here in
Arkansas.
A. States that Allow Passive Discovery of Witness
Statements and Police Reports
A nationwide survey of criminal discovery rules found that
currently thirty-four states allow for discovery of witness
statements and eighteen states allow for discovery of police
reports.177 However, the list is actually broader than the blackletter rules would indicate. For instance, Iowa and Nebraska do
not provide for discovery of witness statements or police reports,
and Missouri, Vermont, Indiana, North Dakota, Montana, and
Washington all do not provide for discovery of police reports.178
175.
176.
177.
178.

See supra Section II.D.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
Turner & Redlich, supra note 11, at app. B at 400-08.
Id. at app. B at 401-08.
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However, as discussed further below, these eight states all allow
for defense discovery depositions, which would presumptively
allow for discovery of the same information.179 Similarly, Iowa
also requires that when the prosecutor proceeds by information,
the defense be given “a full and fair statement of [a witness’s]
expected testimony.”180 Conversely, while Louisiana allows for
discovery of witness statements, it only compels disclosure
“immediately prior to the opening statement at trial,”181 which is
only marginally better than the Arkansas mid-trial statute,182 and
therefore, easily discounted. By including the deposition states
and excluding Louisiana because of the insufficient timing, it can
be said that thirty-five states effectively allow for discovery of
witness statements and twenty-six states effectively allow for
discovery of police reports.183 Accordingly, a super-majority of
the states require discovery of witness statements, and slightly
more than a simple majority require discovery of police reports.
Arkansas’s restrictive criminal discovery scheme is in the
minority on both counts.
B. States that Allow Affirmative Defense Discovery
Depositions
In total, thirteen states currently allow for discovery
depositions in criminal cases.184 Seven states allow for
depositions as a matter of right and six states require court
approval.185 Vermont, Florida, Indiana, Missouri, Iowa, North
Dakota, and New Mexico all allow defense attorneys to conduct
discovery depositions as a matter of right without prior court
179. See infra Section IV.B.
180. Turner & Redlich, supra note 11, at app. B at 402 n.412 (quoting IOWA R. CRIM.
P. 2.5(3)).
181. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 716(D)(2) (2014) (stating that the “[S]tate
need not provide the defendant any written or recorded statement of its witnesses until
immediately prior to the opening statement at trial”).
182. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
183. In 1990, Justice William Brennan reported that only fourteen states permitted
discovery of witness statements as of right, and another eight states permitted such discovery
upon leave of court. Brennan, supra note 1, at 10-11. This illustrates the reality that across
America there has been a trend to increase criminal discovery.
184. See infra notes 186-89.
185. See infra notes 186-87.
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approval.186
New Hampshire, Texas, Arizona, Nebraska,
Montana, and Washington all allow for discovery depositions
upon leave of the court for good cause.187 These jurisdictions
generally allow for depositions when a defendant can show a
deposition is necessary to avoid surprise testimony188 or because
the witness refuses to voluntarily speak with defense counsel.189
While Indiana has the broadest rule, stating in its entirety,
“[t]he [S]tate and the defendant may take and use depositions of
witnesses in accordance with the Indiana Rules of Trial
Procedure,”190 the other jurisdictions contain various restrictions
on the use of depositions, even when available as of right. For
example, Vermont and Florida both limit the use of depositions
as of right to felony prosecutions and require the defendant to
show “good cause” for a deposition in a misdemeanor
prosecution.191 Florida even provides for further categorization,
186. VT. R. CRIM. P. 15(a); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h)(1); IND. CODE § 35-37-4-3
(1981); MO. SUP. CT. R. 25.12(a); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 2.13(1); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 15(a); N.M.
R. CRIM. P. DIST. CT. 5-503(B). Technically, the New Mexico rule only allows for
depositions if the parties agree or upon court order “to prevent injustice,” and the
commentary to the rule indicates the right is therefore “limited to the situation where the
person will be unable or unwilling to attend the trial or a hearing.” N.M. R. CRIM. P. DIST.
CT. 5-503(B)(2), commentary. However, a separate portion of the same rule allows for
defendants to subpoena witnesses to give “[s]tatements.” N.M. R. CRIM. P. DIST. CT. 5503(A). One scholar has noted that the rule effectively allows for a less formal version of a
deposition: “In New Mexico, parties may issue a pretrial subpoena and take a recorded
statement—an affordable ‘dirty deposition’ subject to wide use, more cost-effective than a
traditional deposition, and a tool that demonstrates how innovations to formal investigatory
tools might respond to concerns particular to the criminal justice system.” Meyn, supra note
48, at 1110. New Mexico also gives defendants the same ability to subpoena witnesses for
interviews for low-level offenses in front of metropolitan or magistrate courts. N.M. R.
CRIM. P. METRO. CT. 7-504(C)(1); N.M. R. CRIM. P. MAGIS. CT. 6-504(D). For these
reasons, I include New Mexico among the jurisdictions that allows for discovery depositions
as a matter of right.
187. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13(II)(b) (2004); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
39.02 (West 2005); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.3(a); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1917(1) (2020); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-15-201(1)(c) (1993); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.6(a).
188. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13(II)(b) (allowing depositions “[t]o
ensure a fair trial, avoid surprise or for other good cause shown”).
189. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.3(a)(2) (allowing a deposition where a witness’s
testimony is material or necessary for preparation of the defense, the witness was not
previously examined at a preliminary hearing, and the witness “will not cooperate in granting
a personal interview”); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 4.6(a)(2) (allowing depositions where
“a witness refuses to discuss the case with either counsel and the witness’s testimony is
material and necessary”).
190. IND. CODE § 35-37-4-3.
191. VT. R. CRIM. P. 15(e)(4); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h)(1)(D).
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allowing for unilateral depositions of certain types of witnesses,
such as eyewitnesses, investigating officers, or expert witnesses,
but requires leave of court to depose other, less substantial
witnesses.192 However, Vermont and Florida both prohibit
deposing law enforcement officers who engage in only minor
“ministerial” roles or whom the prosecution does not intend to
call at trial.193
Also, in an effort to curb witness intimidation, Vermont,
Florida, Missouri, and Arizona all place restrictions on the
physical presence of the defendant at the deposition.194
Conversely, North Dakota allows defendants to be present except
when they are in custody, where they must obtain leave of
court.195 Relatedly, while many of the states have broad catch-all
language regarding protective orders to prevent embarrassment or
harassment,196 Vermont, Florida, and New Hampshire all have
explicit provisions concerning the depositions of children or other
sensitive witnesses. Vermont creates a presumption that children

192. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h)(1)(A) (allowing for unilateral deposition of “Category
A” witnesses); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h)(1)(B) (requiring leave of court to depose “Category
B” witnesses). Category A witnesses include:
(1) eye witnesses, (2) alibi witnesses and rebuttal to alibi witnesses, (3)
witnesses who were present when a recorded or unrecorded statement was
taken from or made by a defendant or codefendant, which shall be separately
identified within this category, (4) investigating officers, (5) witnesses known
by the prosecutor to have any material information that tends to negate the
guilt of the defendant as to any offense charged, (6) child hearsay witnesses,
(7) expert witnesses who have not provided a written report and a curriculum
vitae or who are going to testify, and (8) informant witnesses, whether in
custody, who offer testimony concerning the statements of a defendant about
the issues for which the defendant is being tried.
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(b)(1)(A)(i).
193. VT. R. CRIM. P. 15(e)(3)(A); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(b)(1)(A)(iii) (defining
Category C witnesses as those “who performed only ministerial functions or whom the
prosecutor does not intend to call at trial and whose involvement with and knowledge of the
case is fully set out in a police report or other statement furnished to the defense”); FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.220 (h)(1)(C) (prohibiting depositions of Category C witnesses).
194. VT. R. CRIM. P. 15(b); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h)(7); MO. SUP. CT. R. 25.12(c);
ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.3(a)(2), (e) (excluding the defendant’s right to be present at a discovery
deposition of a witness that would not previously cooperate in granting a personal interview).
195. N.D. R. CRIM. P. 15(f)(1).
196. See, e.g., N.D. R. CRIM. P. 15(a)(4) (providing for the court to address concerns
of annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or burden to the deponent by disallowing the
deposition or otherwise limiting the scope and manner of the deposition).
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sex-crime victims should not be deposed197 and the depositions of
children and other sensitive witnesses should generally be
reached through careful agreement of the parties or intervention
by the court.198 Florida’s rule offers the simple solution of having
the depositions of children and sensitive witnesses be video
recorded or conducted in front of the trial judge or a special
magistrate,199 presumptively to reduce the odds that a defendant
or his counsel would seek to intimidate the witness. However,
New Hampshire provides the simplest scheme, prohibiting
deposing any person under the age of sixteen.200 Relatedly,
though not limited to children, North Dakota and Arizona give all
alleged victims the right to refuse to submit to a deposition by the
defendant.201
There is plenty of variation among how these states have
chosen to execute criminal discovery depositions, but one
conclusion is clear: these states have all decided that the interest
in increasing fairness and factual transparency in criminal
litigation outweighs the concerns of delay or bad faith on behalf
of defendants.202 Furthermore, the varied schemes adopted by the
states shows us that there are numerous ways to address any
concerns of abuse of the deposition process rather than simply
prohibiting the practice entirely. Most importantly, these states
show us that the fears of doomsday opponents of criminal
depositions are not realistic. These states have all allowed
defense discovery depositions and they have not yet fallen into a
void of chaos and misery. They continue to operate and thrive in
spite of providing criminal defendants a fairer process.
V. POLICY ARGUMENTS
For over sixty years, scholars and jurists—no less than
Supreme Court Justice William Brennan—have called for the use
197. VT. R. CRIM. P. 15(e)(5).
198. VT. R. CRIM. P. 15(f)(2).
199. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(h)(4).
200. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13(V) (2003).
201. N.D. R. CRIM. P.15(a)(5); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 39(b)(12).
202. See H. Morley Swingle, Depositions in Criminal Cases in Missouri, 60 J. MO.
BAR 128, 134 (2004) (noting that despite the financial burdens of depositions, neither Florida
nor Missouri have yet to discard criminal depositions).
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of depositions in criminal cases.203 The use of depositions in
criminal cases would have tremendous benefits. Discovery
depositions would aid the search for truth by bringing relevant
facts to light and they would do so in a more expedient manner.
Depositions would enhance the fairness of our adversarial system
by treating the defense and the prosecution as truly equal
opponents, thereby improving defense counsel’s ability to
provide effective representation and enhancing our faith in the
legitimacy of case outcomes. Lastly, depositions would give
defense counsel an affirmative role to play in pre-trial discovery
rather than his current role as a passive participant receiving
curated disclosures from the prosecution’s investigation.
While opponents to depositions have historically raised
concerns of perjury or witness intimidation as reasons to forego
the practice,204 those concerns are not borne out by any empirical
foundation. More importantly, rather than allowing generalized
fears to control the approach, such concerns of abuse of the
process can and should be readily addressed by the trial court on
a case-by-case basis.
A. Depositions Aid the Search for the Truth
It is a fundamental tenet of the law that the truest, most just
outcomes are best achieved by encouraging rather than restraining
relevant evidence.205 “The admission of every light which reason
and experience can supply for the discovery of truth, and the
rejection of that only which serves not to guide but to bewilder
203. See generally Brennan, supra note 1 (calling for the extension of civil pre-trial
discovery to criminal cases); Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of
Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1192-93 (1960).
204. See generally discussion infra Sections V.C.-D.
205. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408-09 (1988) (citing United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974)) (“We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal
justice in which the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to develop all
relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of
criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative
presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in
the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of
evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that
compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the
prosecution or by the defense.”).
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and mislead, is the great principle that ought to be the foundation
of every system of evidence.”206 A criminal trial “is a quest for
truth.”207
The Arkansas Supreme Court has already recognized that
essential to the quest for truth is the need for defense counsel to
have access to witnesses with relevant information:
A criminal trial, like its civil counterpart, is a quest for
truth. That quest will more often be successful if both sides
have an equal opportunity to interview the persons who have
the information from which the truth may be determined.
The current tendency in the criminal law is in the direction
of discovery of the facts before trial and elimination of
surprise at trial . . . . In a criminal case, the district attorney
should not hesitate to show his entire file to the defendant.
It is not the primary duty of the district attorney to convict a
defendant. It is his primary duty to see that the defendant
has a fair trial, that justice be done.208

The court’s language originates from the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals in Gregory v. United States, where the court held that it
was unlawful for the prosecution to instruct witnesses not to speak
with anyone, which obstructed defense counsel.209 The court
noted, “[w]itnesses, particularly eye witnesses, to a crime are the
property of neither the prosecution nor the defense. Both sides
have an equal right, and should have an equal opportunity, to
interview them.”210 Without free access to the witnesses, the
defense could not evaluate what the witnesses would testify to or
206. Heard v. Farmers’ Bank of Hardy, 174 Ark. 194, 206, 295 S.W. 38, 43 (1927)
(“But to exclude relevant evidence by any positive and arbitrary rule must be not only absurd
in a scientific view, but, what is worse, frequently productive of absolute injustice. It may
safely be laid down that the less the process of inquiry is fettered by rules and restraints,
founded on supposed considerations of policy and convenience, the more certain and
efficacious will it be in its operation. Formerly the very means devised for the discovery of
truth and advancement of justice were not unfrequently perverted to the purposes of injustice,
and made the instruments of the most grievous and cruel oppression.”).
207. Birchett v. State, 289 Ark. 16, 20, 708 S.W.2d 625, 627 (1986) (quoting State v.
Manus, 597 P.2d 280, 288 (N.M. 1979)); David A. Harris, The Constitution and Truth
Seeking: A New Theory on Expert Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 469, 494-95 (1992) (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 33 (2d ed. 1982)).
208. Birchett, 289 Ark. at 20, 708 S.W.2d at 627 (internal citations omitted).
209. Id.; Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
210. Gregory, 369 F.2d at 188.
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“how firm they were in their testimony.”211 Limiting a
defendant’s access to witnesses is inherently prejudicial because,
as the United States Supreme Court and “[c]ommon sense” tell
us, interviewing potential witnesses is a routine part of criminal
defense.212
Depositions would allow defense counsel to fill in the gaps
of the prosecutor’s file by deposing police officers and witnesses.
Officers and witnesses are human. They are not perfect archivists
and we can blamelessly expect them to omit relevant information
from time to time. An investigating officer could be deposed to
fill in the gaps for what he may have left out of his report, such as
steps in the investigation he did not think were of significance.
Also, to the extent any witness statement is voluntarily provided
in discovery to the defense, a witness can only answer the
questions asked of her. A deposition would allow the defense
attorney to ask follow-up questions to gain a more complete
understanding of the case. Also, oftentimes, police reports
contain merely the officer’s secondhand account of what the
witness told him. Depositions would allow for defense counsel
to test the accuracy of the reporting officer’s information. More
importantly, if the prosecutor fails to disclose any witness
statements, resting on the protections of Rule 17.1,213 then
depositions would allow the defense counsel to learn anything
about the case he is defending aside from the limited facts in the
information.
Additionally, depositions could facilitate the pleabargaining process by more speedily revealing the strengths and
weaknesses of the case.214 Broad pre-plea discovery in general
can reduce disputes among the parties and speed up the
negotiating process.215 Another advantage to be gained is that
211. Id. at 189.
212. Montoya, supra note 51, at 851 (“Common sense would suggest, and trial
advocacy experts agree, that the pretrial interrogation of a potential witness is an essential
prerequisite to calling the witness at trial.”); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415-16 (1988)
(“Routine preparation involves location and interrogation of potential witnesses . . . .”).
213. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text; ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1.
214. Prosser, supra note 32, at 612-13; see also Meyn, supra note 48, at 1091-92
(noting how civil discovery works to empower both litigants to equally assess liability during
the pre-trial phase).
215. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 11, at 290-91.
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providing defense counsel with the ability to depose witnesses
would actually reduce the prosecutor’s burden.216 Arkansas case
law routinely cites the standards that a defendant cannot rely on
the State’s file as a substitution for his own investigation217 and
that under an open-file scheme, the defense attorney bears the
burden of checking the file for new material.218 Allowing the
defense to conduct depositions fits squarely within those
standards. Depositions would allow defense counsel to build his
own file rather than rely on the State’s. Instead of the defendant
crafting specific discovery requests asking about what a witness
did or did not say, the defendant could simply go ask the witness
himself. Allowing defense depositions would reduce the
defendant’s reliance on the prosecutor for information.
Ultimately, the civil practice has long recognized the utility
in deposing adverse witnesses.219 Prosecutors also enjoy that
benefit.220 Currently, the criminal defendant is the only litigant
in Arkansas who does not have the power to conduct discovery
depositions. He is the only litigant who is subjected against his
will to a “quest for truth” but his search must be done blindfolded.
B. Depositions Increase Trust in the Criminal Process
Additionally, investigating and interviewing witnesses falls
squarely under the umbrella of defense counsel’s obligation to
provide “effective” assistance of counsel.221 The Eighth Circuit
216. One criticism of open-file discovery is that it places an administrative burden on
prosecutors and law enforcement to compile the information. Id. at 311.
217. See, e.g., Thomerson v. State, 274 Ark. 17, 20, 621 S.W.2d 690, 692 (1981) (“A
defendant in a criminal case cannot rely upon discovery as a total substitute for his own
investigation.”).
218. See, e.g., Findley v. State, 64 Ark. App. 291, 297, 984 S.W.2d 454, 457 (1998)
(holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding no discovery violation occurred
when defense counsel and the prosecutor disagreed as to whether and when certain exhibits
offered at trial were contained in the State’s open file because there was no assurance that
the defense attorney had checked the State’s file sixty days before trial).
219. See generally supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
220. See supra Section II.D.
221. Montoya, supra note 51, at 862; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686
(1984). For a discussion of why broad pre-trial discovery should be encouraged and analyzed
under the doctrine of effective assistance of counsel, see generally Jenny Roberts, Too Little,
Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery
in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097 (2004).
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has squarely rejected the notion that the decision of whether or
not to interview a witness is a matter of trial strategy, instead
stating squarely, “Counsel has ‘a duty . . . to investigate all
witnesses who allegedly possessed knowledge concerning [the
defendant’s] guilt or innocence.’”222 Moreover, the entire
rationale behind requiring “effective” assistance of defense
counsel and adequate pre-trial investigation is to ensure the
legitimacy of the outcome of the case.223 Currently, the defense
bar is confounded by a legal paradox. Defense counsel has a legal
and ethical duty to vigorously investigate his client’s case, but he
has no tools to fulfill this duty.224 A defendant has the right to
subpoena a witness to attend at trial, but he does not have the right
to first subpoena and examine that witness before the trial to
ascertain his testimony.225
Cross-examination is often lauded as a “crucible”226 and
ultimately the greatest truth-seeking device known to our justice
system,227 but such claims are mere rhetoric when viewed in light
of the fact that members of the Arkansas defense bar are being
asked to conduct cross-examinations with one arm tied behind
their backs. Cross-examination is only useful to the extent that
the examining party has access to relevant information with
sufficient time to prepare to properly utilize it.228
222. Henderson v. Sargent, 926 F.2d 706, 711 (8th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added)
(quoting Lawrence v. Armontrout, 900 F.2d 127, 130 (8th Cir. 1990)).
223. Roberts, supra note 221, at 1104-05 (“[T]he right to effective assistance advances
the same goal as that of the criminal justice system more generally: fairness within the
adversary process, with the ultimate objective that the guilty are convicted and the innocent
are acquitted.”); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (“The benchmark for judging any claim of
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of
the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”).
224. See Prosser, supra note 32, at 591 (“It would be anomalous to impose a duty to
investigate, on one hand, and on the other to make a real investigation impossible to
conduct.”).
225. See Montoya, supra note 51, at 866-67.
226. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
227. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 349 (1981) (“[U]nder our adversary system of
justice, cross-examination has always been considered a most effective way to ascertain
truth.”); id. at 349 n.4 (“As Professor Wigmore put it, ‘[cross-examination] is beyond any
doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.’”) (quoting 5 JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367, at 32 (rev. 1974)).
228. Laura Berend, Less Reliable Preliminary Hearings and Plea Bargains in
Criminal Cases in California: Discovery Before and After Proposition 115, 48 AM. U. L.
REV. 465, 472 (1998); Prosser, supra note 32, at 579 (“[R]ules that do not allow discovery
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Cross-examination is designed to cement, not uncover, a
narrative. Trial does not provide the optimum forum to
refresh a witness’ recollection, a process that can result in
long periods of silence as a witness reviews documents.
Trial is in part a public spectacle, roles have already been
assigned, the script finalized. If a defendant has not
adequately investigated the incident by the eve of trial, it is
too late for defendant. He will lose.229

As far as crucibles go, a system of cross-examination where the
examiner only has a short time to prepare immediately after the
witness testifies on direct examination and where the examiner
has no power to submit the witness to an interview of any sort
prior to trial to glean any information about the boundaries of her
testimony seems like a pretty comfortable “crucible.”
Furthermore, it should not be a controversial claim to point
out that limited discovery encourages wrongful convictions and
unfair punishments.230 More specifically, because we currently
operate in a system of plea bargaining,231 we have to acknowledge
that the defense bar’s ability to provide effective representation
and advice during the negotiation process is directly restricted by
limited discovery.232 The criminal defense bar currently assumes
the daunting task of negotiating with the State under a system of
“information asymmetry”—meaning the defense is forced to
of the prior statements of government witnesses until after the direct examination of those
witnesses curtail the ability of counsel to conduct an investigation based on the contents of
the statements, and to effectively impeach the witnesses with inconsistencies.”); see also J.
Thomas Sullivan, Brady-Based Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims, Buckley, and the
Arkansas Coram Nobis Remedy, 64 ARK. L. REV. 561, 562-563 (2011) (“Often missed in
the Brady analysis is the impact that suppression of favorable evidence can have on trial
counsel’s ability to effectively represent the defendant at trial, yet Brady claims are not
analyzed in terms of the Sixth Amendment effective-assistance guarantee. Defense counsel
can hardly develop appropriate strategic or tactical options without having access to
favorable evidence.”).
229. Meyn, supra note 48, at 1134.
230. Prosser, supra note 32, at 549-50.
231. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (“[Plea bargaining] is not some
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.”) (quoting Scott &
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)); Lafler v. Cooper,
566 U.S. 156, 157 (2012) (“[C]riminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas,
not a system of trials.”).
232. Prosser, supra note 32, at 558-61; Baer, supra note 132, at 25 (“[C]riminal
discovery’s information asymmetry severely undermines the integrity and reliability of the
plea-bargaining process.”).
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negotiate based on what facts the prosecutor chooses to reveal and
what he chooses to conceal.233 Most importantly, asymmetrical
plea-bargaining encourages factually innocent defendants to
accept plea offers.234 Innocent defendants, being generally more
risk averse than guilty defendants, are much more susceptible to
the pressures of the plea bargaining process where they are faced
with the impossible choice between pleading guilty to a crime
they did not commit or risking the steeper penalties if found guilty
at a trial.235
One of the justifications given for limiting the scope of
Brady litigation and overall criminal discovery is a focus on the
adversarial nature between the prosecution and the defense.236
However, this reasoning is self-defeating. After all, if we want
the criminal justice system to be “adversarial” and we want crossexaminations to be “crucibles” designed to elicit the truth, should
we not enhance the armaments of each side?237 This is the
reasoning in civil discovery. Civil procedure allows for broad
discovery through a multitude of different mechanisms, including
subpoenas, depositions, interrogatories, and requests for
production.238 The reason for enhancing and broadening civil
discovery was the recognition that proper litigation is best served
by full revelation of all relevant facts and not by surprise and
ambush at trial.239 Again, if we want the criminal justice system
to be adversarial and we believe that such adversariality is our
best means of ensuring that the truth is ferreted out, the guilty are
convicted, and the innocent go free, then why are we asking
members of the defense bar to rise to the fight with one arm tied
233. See Ion Meyn, The Unbearable Lightness of Criminal Procedure, 42 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 39, 40-41 (2014); Meyn, supra note 48, at 1091-92 (“A criminal defendant, having no
discretion to compel pretrial discovery and permitted but a keyhole view of the State’s
evidence, is the only litigant relegated to darkness.”).
234. Turner & Redlich, supra note 11, 289-90.
235. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2495 (2004).
236. Prosser, supra note 32, at 564; Montoya, supra note 51, at 876.
237. See Montoya, supra note 51, at 874-78 (arguing empowering defense factgathering powers under the Compulsory Process Clause will enhance the adversarial nature
of criminal litigation).
238. ARK. R. CIV. P. 26-36.
239. Prosser, supra note 32, at 581 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501, 507
(1947)).
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behind their backs?240 Allowing defense depositions would
increase the amount of relevant information available to both
sides before trial, therefore enhancing the fairness and
functionality of our adversarial trial system.241 If we can trust that
a defense attorney had all the necessary tools at his disposal, his
client’s guilt can more confidently be viewed as the result of the
truth rather than the result of the weight of the system.
C. Fears of Perjury
One of the historic arguments against allowing depositions
as well as broadening criminal discovery in general is that it will
lead to perjury.242 The argument goes that if the defendant is
aware of the nature of the prosecution’s case, he will fabricate
evidence to conjure a defense.243 However, this argument is
essentially outdated fearmongering, as the exact same concerns
of perjury were raised and ultimately proven unfounded when
civil discovery was reformed and broadened in the early twentieth
century.244 Moreover, this argument erroneously assumes that all
criminal defendants are corrupt bad guys245 and all prosecutors
and police are honest good guys.246 It is flawed to assume that
depositions will lead defendants to commit perjury while ignoring

240. See Meyn, supra note 48, at 1095 (“These asymmetrical privileges to information
create a dynamic unique to criminal law. The prosecutor assesses the particular facts that
executive agents forward to her, releases facts she determines a defendant should view, and
adjudicates the dispute through a plea offer that is supported by facts she selects. Though a
criminal defendant has no structurally assigned role in the investigation, he is subjected to
an adversarial process. If the integrity of the adversarial system depends on testing the
pretrial conclusion made by the executive in its investigation, the failure to create the
conditions for a counter-investigation undermines that integrity.”).
241. See Daniel S. McConkie, The Local Rules Revolution in Criminal Discovery, 39
CARDOZO L. REV. 59, 69-70 (2017) (arguing broad discovery in general improves the
adversary system).
242. Brennan, supra note 1, at 289; Roberts, supra note 221, at 1151.
243. Brennan, supra note 1, at 289.
244. See Roberts, supra note 221, at 1151; Brennan, supra note 1, at 291.
245. See Prosser, supra note 32, at 583 (“While those who object to broad discovery
rarely openly acknowledge that they presume that the accused are guilty, the reasons that
have been advanced for denying, delaying, or limiting discovery clearly reflect that
presumption.”); see also Brennan, supra note 1, at 287 (arguing limiting pre-trial discovery
disregards and jeopardizes the presumption of innocence).
246. See Prosser, supra note 32, at 583-84.
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a recorded history of police and prosecutors committing or
suborning perjury.247
More importantly, this argument does a disservice to
members of our defense bar who are bound by the same rules of
ethics as any other lawyer.248 It is a baseless and insulting
conclusion that implies these members are inherently dishonest
and untrustworthy. If the fear that defense attorneys would allow
their clients to fabricate evidence and present perjury holds any
weight, then it must also be said that the defense bar in its entirety
must immediately be disbarred. If defense attorneys present such
a dangerous risk to the inherent fairness of our justice system,
they have no right to continue practicing law lest they wreak more
havoc and fraud on the courts.

247. Jennifer E. Koepke, The Failure to Breach the Blue Wall of Silence: The Circling
of the Wagons to Protect Police Perjury, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 211, 221 (2000) (“Police
perjury has become very common in brutality cases, primarily because of the pressures an
officer receives from his colleagues. Police perjury is a widely known problem in the legal
system, but it is almost impossible to define the scope and depth to which it occurs.”); Gabriel
J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie:
A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233, 234 (1998) (“[I]n New York,
‘the practice of police falsification . . . is so common in certain precincts that it has spawned
its own word: “testilying.”’”) (quoting REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE
ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE
POLICE DEPARTMENT 36 (1994)); Jay Sterling Silver, Truth, Justice, and the American Way:
The Case Against the Client Perjury Rules, 47 VAND. L. REV. 339, 358 (1994) (“In criminal
cases, the proclivity of prosecutors to tolerate police perjury is widely acknowledged.”);
Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution, 32
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 348 (2005) (“The anecdotal evidence suggests that prosecutors
often ignore manifestations of police corruption.”); Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue:
Instructing Jurors to Consider the Testimony of Police Officer Witnesses with Caution, 44
PEPP. L. REV. 245, 272-77 (2017) (providing several anecdotal examples of reported police
perjury). Recently, here in Arkansas, the Little Rock Police Department has been caught
filing false affidavits to obtain search warrants. Hannah Grabenstein, Lawsuit: Little Rock
Police Lied to Conduct Drug Raids, AP NEWS (Oct. 15, 2018), [https://perma.cc/4AASHJUW]. One affidavit stated that three officers saw an informant walk up to the door of an
apartment and make a controlled purchase of cocaine. Id. However, the resident’s security
footage showed that he was not even home at the time, and nobody ever opened the door for
the informant. Id. Nevertheless, the Little Rock Police filed the affidavit (committing
perjury) and violently executed the search warrant using explosives to gain entry into the
apartment. Id.
248. Brennan, supra note 1, at 291-92.
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D. Fears of Witness Intimidation
Another common argument against criminal depositions is
the concern that they may be used to intimidate or harass victims
and witnesses, especially the vulnerable ones, such as children.249
However, this overgeneralized fear is likely the result of circular
logic or a “feedback loop” rather than actual experiences of such
abuse.250 In a traditionally restrictive jurisdiction, denying a
criminal defendant discovery tools reinforces a perception of the
defendant as dangerous, lawless, and untrustworthy.251 A survey
of Virginia and North Carolina prosecutors provides an excellent
example of this process. In Virginia, a restrictive closed-file
discovery state, roughly forty-seven percent of prosecutors were
concerned that open-file discovery encourages witness
intimidation or manipulation.252 Conversely, in North Carolina,
a state with broader open-file discovery, only ten percent of
prosecutors shared this concern.253 This is the feedback loop. The
rules of the system inform our expectations of what a “just”
system should look like and thereby undermines the legitimacy of
alternatives.254
Yet, notably, fears of witness intimidation and manipulation
are not unique to the criminal case. If a rape victim also sues her
rapist, she can be deposed in the civil suit, and the experience is
surely just as nerve-wracking. There is nothing per se in the law
that says certain subject matters excuse a witness from a
deposition. There is no legal alchemy that makes a witness
immune to pressures from the deposition process simply because
the case title on the transcript designates the matter as civil rather
than criminal. After all, in our example, the defendant is an
249. Id. at 289; Ortman, supra note 51, at 501-02.
250. See Meyn, supra note 48, at 1822-23 (describing how criminal discovery rules
create feedback loops of expectations based on what the rules say is permissible).
251. Id.
252. Turner & Redlich, supra note 11, at 297, 359.
253. Id. at 359.
254. See Julie A. Nice, Equal Protection’s Antinomies and the Promise of a CoConstitutive Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1392, 1413-14 (2000) (“[T]he power exerted
by a legal regime consists less in the force that it can bring to bear against violators of its
rules than in its capacity to persuade people that the world described in its images and
categories is the only attainable world in which a sane person would want to live.”) (quoting
Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 109 (1984)).
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alleged rapist either way. There is no logical explanation as to
how our hypothetical rapist presents such a generalized fear of
intimidation in the criminal case to bar depositions, yet he retains
the right to depose the victim in the civil suit. Case stylings do
not impact human emotion.
E. Fears of High Costs
Perhaps the most salient objection to criminal discovery
depositions is the concern that they will simply present too great
of a financial and administrative burden.255 After all, subpoenas
will have to be served, witnesses will need to be compensated for
their time, police officers will have to take time away from regular
duties, stenographers will need to be paid, and transcripts will
need to be prepared. However, there are two problems with this
concern.
First, we cannot be so prideful to think that Arkansas is the
only state with an interest in balancing the budget. The thirteen
aforementioned states have all made the policy decision that the
benefits of discovery depositions justify the accompanying
costs.256 For example, on two occasions, the Florida deposition
practice came under heavy attack for its costs, but both times the
system prevailed with the recognition that the depositions provide
too great of a contribution to the fairness and efficacy of the
criminal justice system as a whole.257
Relatedly, “[t]hat something isn’t free tells us virtually
nothing about whether it is worthwhile.”258 The issue here is
whether depositions will increase the accuracy and fairness of our
criminal system. If better justice is the benefit of the bargain, then
the incident costs are wholly justified.259 Over sixty years ago,
the United States Supreme Court recognized, “[t]here can be no
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the

255. Ortman, supra note 51, at 496-97.
256. See discussion supra Section IV.B.; see, e.g., Swingle, supra note 202, at 134
(noting that despite the financial burdens, neither Florida nor Missouri have yet to discard
criminal depositions).
257. Ortman, supra note 51, at 497-98.
258. Id. at 496.
259. See Prosser, supra note 32, at 613.
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amount of money he has.”260 There is certainly room
pragmatism, and it is incontrovertible that resources are
infinite. However, we cannot let money entirely dictate
justice we merit out. Otherwise, we have to ask if we
comfortable assigning a dollar value to a person’s liberty.

for
not
the
are

F. Any Fears Should Govern Exceptions, Not the Rule
Fears of perjury, witness intimidation, or other misconduct
should guide how we handle exceptions and not the rule. Rather
than closing off the discovery of the truth to the innocent
defendant and honest defense counsel because of perceived fears
of the guilty and the unethical, we should reframe the procedure.
Rather than have the defendant plead why he should be allowed
to investigate his case, we should open the doors to discovery and
put the burden on the prosecution to articulate specific concerns
as to why the doors should be closed or left only ajar.261 As
discussed above, other states have already found numerous
mechanisms, ranging from detailed to broad, to handle casespecific restrictions on depositions to curb case-specific concerns
of abuse.262 This is the pattern in civil procedure where we allow
discovery but reserve the court’s authority to issue protective
orders to maintain the integrity of the process.263 There is no
reason such a system cannot be expected to work just as well in
criminal cases. “The possibility that a dishonest accused will
misuse such an opportunity is no reason for committing the
injustice of refusing the honest accused a fair means of clearing
himself.”264
VI. PROPOSALS FOR NEW LEGISLATION/RULES
Based on the foregoing arguments in favor of allowing
defense discovery depositions in criminal cases and the lack of
260. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
261. See Prosser, supra note 32, at 595-96 (arguing the State should carry the burden
of showing the need for a protective order to limit discovery).
262. See supra Section IV.B.
263. See ARK. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
264. Brennan, supra note 1, at 291 (quoting 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
1863, at 488 (3d ed. 1940)).
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any empirical-based policy rationale to keep Arkansas in the
minority of jurisdictions favoring criminal trials by surprise, I
recommend that the Arkansas Supreme Court amend the
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure to provide for defense
discovery depositions.265 The burden of drafting a properly
worded amendment to the rules is best left to the Arkansas
Supreme Court Committee on Criminal Practice. Therefore, I
will simply provide a list of goals I believe any proposed rule
should aim to achieve.
First, depositions should be permitted to be conducted as a
matter of right rather than by leave of court. Any concerns of
abuse of the process and delay caused by unnecessary depositions
ignores the fact that defense attorneys have their own schedules
to keep. The defense bar is no more interested in wasting time
than the State is. This is particularly true of our overburdened
public defenders who do not have the luxury of time to waste on
needless inquisitions. Because a defense attorney should only be
expected to resort to a deposition when it is truly needed,
requiring prior court approval would only serve to delay the
proceedings.
Second, defendants not in custody should be permitted to be
present at the deposition absent a showing of good cause by the
State as to why the defendant’s presence would be prejudicial to
the State or the witness. Our criminal justice system operates on
a right to confront one’s accusers.266 It admittedly takes courage
to stand in front of one’s abuser, but it also takes courage to lie
while staring a man in the eye.267 A witness will have to give his
testimony in front of the defendant at trial anyway, so absent
particularized concerns raised by the State, the defendant’s
presence at the deposition should be permitted. Relatedly,
defendants in custody should be permitted to appear via video or
telephone. Just because an individual cannot afford bail does not
mean that should be held against him for depositions.

265. The same reforms could also be achieved through the Arkansas Legislature.
266. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 5.
267. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988) (“It is always more difficult to tell a lie
about a person ‘to his face’ than ‘behind his back.’ In the former context, even if the lie is
told, it will often be told less convincingly.”).
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Third, depositions of children should be permitted with leave
of court. Rather than a whole cloth prohibition of depositions of
children, defendants should have to first establish a particularized
need to depose the child, for example, by providing what
information is being sought and explaining how the current
discovery materials fail to cover such information. Of course,
children should be permitted to have parents or an ad litem
present. By having the trial court approve the deposition, the
court can address any concerns for the child’s best interests and
impose any restrictions necessary as to the scope and manner of
the deposition.
Fourth, alleged victims should not be given a right to refuse
a deposition. While it may be harrowing for a victim to be
deposed by his abuser, confrontation takes courage. Any
legitimate concerns of intimidation, harassment, or
embarrassment could easily be remedied by a motion from the
State to restrict or remove the defendant’s presence at the
deposition rather than disallowing the deposition altogether.
Victims should certainly be allowed to be accompanied by the
prosecutor and an advocate for emotional support. Victims
should also be allowed to have independent counsel present.
Fifth, subpoenaed witnesses should be compensated for their
time in the same manner as currently done under Arkansas Rule
of Civil Procedure 45(e).268 However, any witness should only
be subjected to being deposed one time. In the case of
codefendants, the examination time of any individual witness
should be shared amongst the codefendants.269 The State should
bear the expenses for indigent defendants, including
compensation for witnesses, the costs of having a stenographer or
videographer present, and the costs of having transcripts
prepared.
Sixth, aside from alleged victims, prosecutors should not be
permitted as a matter of right to sit in on depositions unless a
reciprocal right is given to defense counsel to sit in on prosecutor
subpoenas. If the goal is to truly open up criminal discovery, then
268. ARK. R. CIV. P. 45(e) (providing that witnesses shall be paid $30 a day for their
attendance and $0.25 per mile for travel from the witness’s residence to the place of the
deposition).
269. See, e.g., VT. R. CRIM. P. 15(e)(1)-(2).
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depositions could certainly be conducted similar to civil
depositions with both parties present.270 However, unless
prosecutors are willing to invite defense attorneys to sit in on their
depositions, it is unfair to ask defense attorneys to save a seat for
prosecutors.
Seventh, any witness deposed should be permitted to be
represented by independent counsel.271
Such counsel’s
interference with the deposition should be restricted to the same
manner of opposition and witness counseling currently permitted
in civil depositions.272
Eighth, depositions should be permitted in both felony and
misdemeanor cases. While we might think of misdemeanors as
“petty” and therefore deserving of less procedure, the reality is
that the vast majority (roughly eighty percent) of our criminal
dockets are misdemeanor offenses.273
More importantly,
although misdemeanors are “petty” compared to felonies,
misdemeanor convictions still carry many of the same collateral
consequences as felony convictions, ranging from employment
discrimination, restricted voting rights, loss of public benefits,
and other general stigmatization.274 The need to protect innocents
and increase transparency to promote the legitimacy of the
process is just as significant for misdemeanor cases as with felony
cases.

270. See ARK. R. CIV. P. 30.
271. See Ortman, supra note 51, at 488 (noting prosecutors do not represent witnesses
or victims, so independent counsel may be warranted in some circumstances).
272. See ARK. R. CIV. P. 30(d).
273. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055,
1063 (2015) (noting there are approximately ten million misdemeanor cases filed every year
in the U.S. compared to 2.3 million felony cases, misdemeanors make up roughly eighty
percent of state dockets, and they are typically the entry point into the criminal justice system
for most Americans); see also ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM.
DEF. LAWS., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S
BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 11 (2009), [https://perma.cc/2Q4Y-D92X] (estimating
approximately 10.5 million misdemeanors were prosecuted in 2006); Mahoney v. Derrick,
2022 Ark. 27, at 10, 2022 WL 404182, at *5 (Hudson, J., concurring) (“Moreover, our district
courts are often the only interaction that the public has with the judiciary. Therefore, it is
critical that we are mindful of the practices and procedures in district courts that may
undermine public confidence in the administration of fair and impartial justice.”).
274. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1323-27 (2012);
Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 297-303 (2011).
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CONCLUSION
The law and our notions of what justice and fairness require
evolve over time. The history of criminal procedure is a clear
picture of a slow but steady march toward equity and protection
of the accused.275 Not everything in the law is as it always was.
The right to appointed counsel, now the cornerstone of criminal
defense, once had to be fought for.276 The right to be informed of
Miranda warnings before being interrogated once had to be
fought for.277 The right to not have phone calls eavesdropped on
by the government once had to be fought for.278 Arkansas has its
own specific history of recognizing additional protections against
the State beyond what the Federal Constitution requires.
Arkansas has recognized the right to be informed of the right to
refuse consent to entry into the home,279 the right to be protected
from nighttime knock-and-talks by officers,280 the right to be free
from pre-textual arrests,281 and the right to not have a vehicle on
private property searched without a warrant absent exigent
circumstances.282 These few examples illustrate that Arkansas is

275. See Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy
in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1642 (2005).
276. Id.; see, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
277. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
278. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
279. State v. Brown, 356 Ark. 460, 474, 156 S.W.3d 722, 732 (2004).
280. See Griffin v. State, 347 Ark. 788, 800, 67 S.W.3d 582, 590 (2002) (finding an
illegal search occurred when officers stealthily approached a defendant’s basement door in
the nighttime with flashlights and inspected the premises, noting there is “no authority for a
‘knock and search’ doctrine holding that after knocking, it is permissible to begin a
warrantless search before anyone comes to the door”); Rikard v. State, 354 Ark. 345, 353,
123 S.W.3d 114, 118 (2003) (citing Griffin with a parenthetical explanation stating
“nighttime incursions on a defendant’s curtilage [are] illegal under Art. 2, § 15, of [the]
Arkansas Constitution”); see also Keenom v. State, 349 Ark. 381, 396-97, 80 S.W.3d 743,
753 (2002) (Brown, J., dissenting) (differentiating the protections afforded by the Arkansas
Constitution and caselaw from those afforded under the Fourth Amendment, noting that the
Arkansas Supreme Court “has shown a sensitivity to abuses caused by nighttime searches,”
yet “federal jurisprudence does not require the exigent circumstances for a nighttime search
warrant set out in [Arkansas] Rule 13.2, much less that those exigent circumstances be
required for a nighttime knock-and-talk”).
281. State v. Sullivan, 348 Ark. 647, 652, 74 S.W.3d 215, 218 (2002).
282. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 14.1(a)(iii). The United States Supreme Court has only ever
stated in a plurality opinion that officers may not search an automobile on private property
without a warrant absent exigent circumstances beyond the inherent mobility of the vehicle

2 ALTMAN.MAN.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

58

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

4/13/22 10:14 AM

Vol. 75:1

no stranger to redefining the boundaries of criminal process as our
shared understanding of fairness and justice evolves. “Law’s
evolution is never done, and for every improvement made there
is another reform that is overdue.”283
There is no reason our criminal procedure has to be written
in stone, forever unyielding to progress. The time has come to
ask if our current procedures are still the best means of achieving
our guiding principles of increasing transparency and fairness and
protecting the individual against the awesome power of the State.
If we truly aim to discover the truth, then let Arkansas defense
attorneys do just that—discover it. Let us achieve “better
justice.”284

itself. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460-62 (1971). The Arkansas Rules
clearly agree with the plurality and provide Arkansans with this additional protection.
283. Brennan, supra note 183, at 2.
284. Brennan, supra note 1, at 279.

